Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1992

Joy A. Hoagland v. Colin G. Hoagland : Brief of
Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
David Bert Havas; Thomas A. Blakely; Havas and Associates; Attorneys for Appellant.
Donn E. Cassity; Sylvia O. Kralik; Loris D. Williams; Romney, Nelson and Cassity; Attorneys for
Appellee.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Hoagland v. Hoagland, No. 920340 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1992).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/3276

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
BRIEF
UTAH
DOCUMENT
KFU
50
•A10
^
f^vj^
DOCKET NO. yL. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
JOY A. HOAGLAND,
Case No. 920340-CA
Appellant,
vs.
COLIN G. HOAGLAND,

Priority No. 16

Appellee.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
AN APPEAL FROM A DECREE OF DIVORCE FROM THE SECOND JUDICIAL
DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
The Honorable Ronald O. Hyde, Presiding

Donn E. Cassity
Sylvia O. Kralik
Loris D. Williams
ROMNEY, NELSON & CASSITY
115 Social Hall Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellee
David Bert Havas
Thomas A. Blakely
HAVAS & ASSOCIATES
2604 Madison Avenue
Ogden, Utah 84401
Attorneys for Appellant

PILED
OCT 201992
Mary T Noefwfi
Clerk of ths GdUft

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
JOY A. HOAGLAND,
Case No. 920340-CA
Appellant,
vs.
COLIN G. HOAGLAND,

Priority No. 16

Appellee.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
AN APPEAL FROM A DECREE OF DIVORCE FROM THE SECOND JUDICIAL
DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
The Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde, Presiding

Donn E. Cassity
Sylvia 0. Kralik
Loris D. Williams
ROMNEY, NELSON & CASSITY
115 Social Hall Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellee
David Bert Havas
Thomas A. Blakely
HAVAS & ASSOCIATES
2604 Madison Avenue
Ogden, Utah 84401
Attorneys for Appellant

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TITLE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

PAGE
ii

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

1

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

2

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

2

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

8

ARGUMENT

10

I. It was not an abuse of discretion for the
Trial Court to set the amount of the alimony
based upon the parties standard of living prior
to separation

10

II. It was not an abuse of discretion for the
Trial Court to declare the home, currently titled
in the Appellant's name, as marital property to be
divided

22

III. It was not an abuse of discretion for the
Trial Court to deny Appellant an award of attorney's
fees

28

IV. The Trial Court did not err in denying judgment
interest on payments to Appellant upon a judgment
for temporary alimony awarded to her prior to the
trial herein
37
CONCLUSION

48

TABLE wr AUTHORITIES
CASES

PAGE

Adams v. Adams, 593 P.2d 147 (III .th l'J /'.M

Tn

,

A,J. MacKay Co. v. Okland Const. Co,,

I I

817 P.2d 333 (Utah 1991)
Bagshaw v. Bagshaw

"'Mr ]

» .

Berger v. Berge.
Bullock v, Joe Bailey Auction LU* »tn *

a ,

*v*ic.i,

Burt v. Bur t, 799 P. 2d 1 1 66 (I It ah App

1 990 )

11, 28, 29

6 7 5 !: 2d 5 52 (I J 1 i ill: i ll 983 )

Clausen v. Clausei I

]3

Doelle V. Bradley, J 84 P 2d ] ] 76 (Utal: i II 989 )
Dube v. Dul «= "

j: 1
|
1

?( " i

1|:)

30

7i1 1?4S (K«j > AT ; »• 1Q9 ' )

Dubois v. Dubois, 29 1 J tal l 2d 1 5

504 P 2ci

:45,4f »

] 380 (I J tal l 1 9 1 3)

Edwards v. Edwards, 324 P. 2d 1 50 (Kan, :i 958 )
English v. EnglisI: I, 565 P 2d 409 (I It \ lit i 111 977 )
Eskelson v. Eskel s on

45, 46
.

10,1 3 14

528 IF 2 ill ll Ill 86 (U 1 al \ 1 9 J I)

First Equity Corp, of Florida v. Utah State Univ.,
544 r ~- 1 "T-- "T r,v i - —
Fletcher v. F U s
1980).

46

.2

Gar dner , - .^ia:^
Hagan v. Hagan,
Hanover Ltd. v. Fielt
Haumont

u ^:s -

Hogue v« H o g u e ,
( U t a h Ann.

,. M

1 8 4 v,iu;< .*« , * u |
1 QQ?

H o w e l l v . H o w e l l , 80(
(I.J+-ah A p p . IQQi
••• i

,i

•-

28

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued)
CASES

PAGE

Huck v. Huck, 734 P.2d 417 (Utah 1986)

12,28

Jackson v. Jackson, 617 P.2d 338 (Utah 1980)

28

Jense v. Jense, 784 P.2d 1249 (Utah App. 1989)

15

Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985)

10

Matter of Estate of Bartell, 776 P.2d 885 (Utah 1989)...21,30,31
Morris v. Morris, 724 P.2d 527 (Alaska 1986)

46,47

Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304 (Utah 1988)

28

Munns v. Munns, 790 P.2d 116 (Utah App. 1990)

36

Naranjo v. Naranjo, 751 P.2d 1144 (Utah App. 1988)

19,20

Nelson v. Newman, 583 P.2d 601 (Utah 1978)

27

Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1987)

11,28,32

Nunley v. Nunley, 737 P.2d 473 (Utah App. 1988)

13

Osguthorpe v. Osguthorpe, 804 P.2d 530 (Utah App. 1990)

27,28

Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96 (Utah 1986)

10

Peck v. Peck, 738 P.2d 1050 (Utah App. 1987)

21

Porco v. Porco, 752 P.2d 365 (Utah App. 1988)

32

Rankin v. Rankin, 275 So.2d 283 (Fla. Dist. App. 1973).

46

Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331 (Utah App. 1988)

29

Ream v. Fitzen, 581 P.2d 145 (Utah 1978)

27

Reed v. Reed, 594 P.2d 871 (Utah 1979)
Riche v. Riche, 784 P. 2d 465 (Utah App. 1989)

15,25
21,30

Roberts v. Roberts, 188 Utah Adv. Rep. 42
(Utah App. 1992).

17,36

Rudman v. Rudman, 812 P.2d 73 (Utah App. 1991)
Savage v. Savage, 658 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1983)
-iii-

17,29,30,33
19

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued)
CASES

PAGES

Smith v. Smith, 738 P.2d 655 (Utah App. 1987)

28

State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991)

29,30

State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987)

21

Stroud v. Stroud, 758 P.2d 905 (Utah 1988)

44

Stroud v. Stroud, 738 P.2d 649 (Utah 1987)

44

Tippetts v. Page Petroleum, Inc., 738 P.2d 635 (Utah 1987)

38

Walker v. Walker, 707 P.2d 110 (Utah 1985)

12,21

Walters v. Walters, 812 P.2d 64 (Utah App. 1991)

22

Whitehead v. Whitehead,
193 Utah Adv. Rep. 8 (Utah App. 1992)

11,43,44

Wilson v. Wilson, 5 Utah 2d 79, 296 P.2d 977 (Utah 1956)

15

Woodward, v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982)

35

Workman v. Workman, 652 P.2d 931 (Utah 1982)

28

STATUTES
Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended):
Section 15-1-4

37

Section 30-3-3

28

Section 30-3-10.6

9,43,45,50

Section 62A-11-401

43,44

COURT RULES
Utah Rules of Civil Procedures:
Rule 52(a), (c)

15,29,31

Rule 54(a), (b)

39,41

Rule 58A (c), (d)

39
-iv-

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued)
PAGE
COURT RULES

(continued)

Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
Rule 4(a)

40

Rule 5(a)

40

-v-

Case No- 920340-CA

HOAGLAND v. HOAGLAND
Appellee's Brief

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The jurisdiction is proper before this Court under the
provisions of Section 78-2a-3(2) (a), Utah Code Annotated.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I.

It was not an abuse of discretion for the Trial Court to set
the amount of the alimony based upon the parties standard of
living prior to separation.

II.

It was not an abuse of discretion for the Trial Court to
declare the home, currently titled in the Appellant's name, as
marital property to be divided.

III. It was not an abuse of discretion for the Trial Court to deny
Appellant an award of attorney's fees.
IV.

The Trial Court did not err in denying judgment interest on
payments to Appellant upon a judgment for temporary alimony
awarded to her prior to the trial herein.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Joy A. Hoagland (hereinafter "Appellant/Plaintiff") filed an
action

for

divorce

against

her

husband,

Colin

G.

Hoagland

(hereinafter "Appellee/Defendant") on August 28, 1989. Record, p.
001.

This case was tried before the Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde,

District

Court

Transcript, p. 1.

Judge,

on

the

28th

day

of

October,

1991.

The Court took the matter under advisement and

issued its Memorandum Decision on the 7th day of November, 1991.
R. p. 272.

Thereafter, counsel for Appellee prepared the initial

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as well as the Decree of
Divorce.

R_^ p. 293. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,

and the Decree of Divorce, were entered with the Court on the 4th
day of December, 1991.

R^ pp. 293, 303.

Appellant filed her

Objection to Entry of Findings of Fact on December 12, 1991, R^ p.
307, leading to the eventual filing of the Amended Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law, R_^ p. 335, and Second Amended Findings of
Fact.

R^ p. 355.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Appellant/Plaintiff, Joy A. Hoagland and Appellee/Defendant,
Colin C. Hoagland were married in Elko, Nevada, September 5, 1973.
Tr. pp. 7, 115. At the time of their marriage the Appellee worked
for Smith's as a manager for one of their stores. Tr. pp. 26, 60.
Appellant, a divorced woman with four minor children to support and
-2-
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who had had trouble getting child support payments from her exhusband, also worked at Smith's where she worked as a backup
bookeeper.

Tr. pp. 42, 67, 68. Appellant's Exhibit No, 15

Four

months after their marriage, the Appellee was promoted to District
manager for Smith's and was responsible for stores in Salt Lake,
Orem, and Provo. Tr, pp. 20, 117. Appellee loved the Appellant's
children and substantially supported them financially during the
entire time that the parties were married.
was born of this marriage.

R^ p. 356.

No child

R^ p. 356.

When the parties were married they first lived in a house at
240 West 4800 South in Ogden, Utah, which had been awarded to
Appellant from her previous divorce.

Tr, pp. 12.

After three

years of marriage, the parties decided to purchase a new home at
151 West 5400 South, Washington Terrace, Utah.
closed in June of 1976.

Tr. p. 14.

The home purchase

The parties resided there

until December of 1986 when Appellee was forced to move to Nevada
in order to obtain work.

Tr. pp. 8, 167.

Both Appellant and

Appellee considered both homes as "our" home, as indicated by
testimony.

Tr. pp. 12-13, 124.

In 1978, the Appellee quit working for Smith's

as district

manager and a partnership was formed to run a grocery business.
Tr. p. 117.

There were

four partners:

the Appellee, the

Appellant, the Appellee's brother, and the Appellant's son. Tr. p.
27.

A store was purchased and the name was changed to Hoagie's

Freeway Market.

Tr. p. 117. At first, the businesses were very
-3-
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successful and gradually totalled three stores.

Tr. p. 123.

The

Appellee consistently worked at one of the businesses as a manager,
the Appellant at first worked full time as a cashier, later as a
bookkeeper, and after a short time worked only on a part time
basis.

Tr. p. 43.

By 1984 however, the stores were beginning to

run in the negative and by 1985 they were very heavy in the
negative.

Tr. p. 154.

In 1986, a creditor of the partnership, Utah Bank and Trust,
in Salt Lake City, approached the Appellee and wanted a lien on the
marital residence for the bank. However, the Appellee refused the
bank a lien. Tr. p. 122. The Appellee, by that time realized that
the partnership would probably be forced into Bankruptcy, and
decided to take action in order to save as much of the marital
assets that had been accumulated by the parties as possible.
Thereafter,

the

partnership

corporations, in May of 1986.

was

converted

Tr. p. 121.

into

two

(2)

Also, in May of 1986

the Appellee executed a Quit-Claim Deed to the marital residence to
the Appellant in furtherance of the parties' efforts to protect the
marital estate. Tr. p. 121. Both parties understood that the sole
reason for the Quit-Claim Deed was to protect the marital residence
from the claims of creditors of the family business.

Tr. p. 156.

The transfer of title to the Appellant was in no way intended by
the parties to deny the Appellee his rights to the marital estate.
Appellee's intention was to keep the Appellant and himself out of
personal bankruptcy.

Tr. pp. 120, 155.
-4-
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bankruptcy

in November of 1986.

Tr. pp. 73, 88.

The day before bankruptcy was filed Appellee and his brother
brought home cash that was on hand at the businesses and the money
was divided.

The share received by the Appellee and the Appellant

was approximately $8,000.00 to $10,000.00.
140.

R^ 358, Tr^ pp. 18,

The Appellee handed the money to the Appellant and never saw

any of the money again. R. p. 358, Tr. p. 140. When the Appellee
accepted employment in December 1986, in Las Vegas, Appellant
retained all of the marital assets, including the $8,000.00 to
$10,000.00 cash, two automobiles, a motor home, all of the home
furniture, furnishings, and the four bedroom home with swimming
pool.

R_^ p. 358.

In contrast, when Appellee left for Las Vegas,

he took with him $300.00, together with a pickup truck that was
encumbered, and a motorcycle. R^ pp.357-358.
After the Bankruptcy Creditors Hearing, Appellee looked for a
job and eventually received an offer in the Ogden area as a
stocker/freight unloader for Harmon's, earning $7.00 per hour. Tr.
p. 162.

Thereafter, Appellee was offered a job by Smith's in

either Tucson, Arizona or Las Vegas, Nevada. Tr. p. 162. Appellee
accepted the job with Smith's and on December 28, 1986 he packed up
and moved to Las Vegas, Nevada.

R. p. 356, Tr. p. 16.

Appellee

began working for Smith's in Las Vegas in January of 1987. R^ p.
357.
Appellee saved his money from his job in Las Vegas in order to
purchase a house in Henderson, Nevada for he and the Appellant.
-5-
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Tr. p. 187. In March of 1987, the Appellant visited the Appellee
in Las Vegas. Appellee showed Appellant the new house on which he
had already made a $2,500.00 down payment.

Tr. pp. 79, 170. The

Appellee informed the Appellant that the mortgage loan was already
approved and the only thing needed was for her to sign the papers.
Tr. p. 158. Appellant refused to move to Las Vegas and stated, "We
have a house in Ogden."

Tr. pp. 79, 80, 81, 157. The Appellant

thereafter abandoned the Appellee and it became clear to Appellee
that there could be no hope for the marriage.
permanently
Appellee.

separated

The parties were

after Appellant's March, 1987 visit to

Agreement was thereafter reached between the parties

whereby, Appellant

agreed

to forego

alimony

in exchange for

Appellee giving Appellant all of the marital assets. Tr. pp. 185,
186,

R^ p. 358.

Appellee lived by the agreement, and, in

addition, voluntarily sent Appellant money for Appellant's mortgage
payments on the marital residence until he was served in September
of 1989 with a divorce complaint in Reno, Nevada, where he had been
transferred.

Appellee then realized that Appellant had violated

their agreement and was seeking alimony, and all of the marital
assets as well.

R^ p. 358, Tr. pp. 185-186.

Subsequent to the separation of the parties, Appellee was
promoted by Smith's to store manager in May of 1987.

Tr. p. 127.

Later, he was transferred to Reno by Smith's and then transferred
again to Phoenix, Arizona.

R^ p. 359.

In January, of 1991, the

Appellee was forced to change his employment from store manager to
-6-
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buyer for Smith's because of his rheumatoid arthritis. R^ p. 360,
Tr. p. 128. Meanwhile, Appellant lived off the money that the
Appellee had left with her. Tr. p. 20, appellant's Exhibit No. 6.
When the money ran out, Appellant got a job working as a cashier in
a grocery store.

Tr. p. 43.

In 1989, Appellant was hired by the

Internal Revenue Service as a seasonal employee and is presently
employed by the IRS.

Tr. p. 44.

It was not until after Appellee had experienced some success
in his employment with Smith's, that the Appellant decided to
renege on the parties' agreement and she filed for a divorce on
August 28, 1989, seeking not only all the marital estate, but also
alimony of $1,500.00 per month in addition to the income from her
job.

Tr. pp. 59, 60. That month the Appellee was served in Reno,

Nevada with a Summons and a Complaint and with an Order to Show
Cause for Temporary Support. R. 1-10 Tr. 5-10. The Appellee filed
an answer to the Complaint.

R_^ p. 27. A Hearing was held on the

Order to Show Cause for Temporary Support. R_^ p. 11. The Appellee
was unable to attend because of his work in Nevada.
However, Appellee

did

file an Objection

1R^ p. 358.

to the Request

for

Temporary Alimony, but no action was ever taken on his objection to
the Order.

R. p. 275.

Temporary alimony was awarded to the

Appellant in the amount of $1,500.00 a month.

R. p. 275, 359.

At the time of the trial, the Appellee was found to be
$27,507.00 in arrears. R_^ p. 359. However, Appellee contends that
he was not given credit for the amounts of money paid to Appellant#
-7-
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
I. IT WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO SET
THE AMOUNT OF THE ALIMONY BASED UPON THE PARTIES' STANDARD OF
LIVING PRIOR TO SEPARATION.
Utah precedents dictate that three factors must be considered
by the Trial Court when it awards alimony, and that there must be
a clear abuse of discretion for the Trial Court's award to be
overruled.

The determination of the standard of living is very

fact sensitive and the Trial has the discretion to consider various
factors, besides the three factors to determine the standard of
living that is most equitable given the specific facts of the case.
The award of alimony to Appellant should be upheld because the
facts support the Court's decision.

II.
IT WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO
DECLARE THE HOME, CURRENTLY TITLED IN THE APPELLANT'S NAME, AS
MARITAL PROPERTY TO BE DIVIDED.
Credibility of witnesses is in the Trial Court's discretion.
The Trial Court correctly believed the Appellee and found the QuitClaim Deed was executed solely to protect the family home from the
Business Creditors.

A Utah case, Hogue, demonstrates that a home

may be found a marital asset even where one spouse has quit-claimed
all rights to the other spouse. The Doctrine of Judicial and Quasi
Estoppel is not applicable here because Appellee did not disclaim
his interest in the home in the corporate bankruptcy, and because
Appellant did not raise these theories in the Trial so she is
-8-
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barred from raising them on appeal. Regardless, the State of Title
is not binding on the Trial Court and it has discretion to
distribute marital property as the Court finds equitable.
III. IT WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO DENY
APPELLANT AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES.
The Trial Court's findings are adequate. In the alternative,
the Trial Court's analysis was sound based upon the evidence set
forth in the record.

In addition, Appellant did not present

sufficient evidence of her financial need, to justify any change in
the decision of the Trial Court.

IV. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING JUDGMENT INTEREST ON
PAYMENTS TO PLAINTIFF UPON A JUDGMENT FOR TEMPORARY ALIMONY AWARDED
TO HER PRIOR TO THE TRIAL HEREIN.
The "judgment" for temporary alimony referred to by Appellant
is not a final judgment for purposes of Section 15-1-4 of the Utah
Code.

Further, neither temporary

nor permanent

governed by Section 30-3-10.6 of the Utah Code.

alimony are

Interest should

not be awarded on past due temporary alimony payments before the
divorce decree is entered.

-9-
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ARGUMENT

1. IT WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO SET
THE AMOUNT OF ALIMONY BASED UPON THE PARTIES' STANDARD OF LIVING
PRIOR TO SEPARATION.
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that "The most important
function of alimony is to provide support for the wife as nearly as
possible at the standard of living she enjoyed during marriage, and
to prevent the wife from becoming a public charge."

English v.

English, 565 P.2d 409, 411 (Utah 1977). The Court goes on to state
that three factors must be considered in fixing a reasonable
alimony award: 1. The financial conditions and needs of the wife.
2.

The ability of the wife to produce a sufficient income for

herself.

3.

The ability of the husband to provide support. See,

Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985).

In Paffel v.

Paffel, 732 P.2d 96, 100 (Utah 1986), the Supreme Court stated,
"This Court will not interfere with the Trial Court's award of such
support in a divorce proceeding absent showing of a clear and
prejudicial abuse of discretion."

The Court further states that

the failure to consider the three factors as listed in English,
constitutes an abuse of discretion.

These three factors were

considered by the Trial Court along with other relevant facts and
support the Court's award of alimony, therefore, this Court should
uphold the Trial Court's award of alimony.
From a recent case it becomes evident that the Court did not
-10-
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abuse its discretion regardless of how the standard of living was
determined.

In Whitehead v. Whitehead,, 193 Utah Adv. Rep. 8, 10

(Utah App. 1992), the Court found that where Mrs. Whitehead's
monthly living expenses were "unsubstantiated," it was not an abuse
of the Trial Court's discretion to deny alimony.

Here, the Trial

Court labeled Appellants' Affidavit of Monthly Living Expenses a
"wish list" and adds that it "reflects a desire on the part of the
Plaintiff to obtain high alimony rather than reasonably advising
the Court of the Plaintiff's actual expenses." R^ p. 361. Besides
the discrepancies discussed by the Court, Appellant denied she ever
spent close to the requested $60.00 per month clothing expense, but
stated, "This is what I should spend."

Tr. p. 106.

Under the

Whitehead holding, the Appellant could be denied any alimony
because she did not provide the Court with an accurate account of
her expenses and failed to prove the first of the three factors.
A Trial Court is not obligated to award alimony in divorce
actions, even where there is considerable difference between the
parties' income. In Burt v. Burt, 799 P. 2d 1166, 1170 (Utah App.
1990), the Court stated:
"While equity should be the watchword as the trial court
apportions property and calculates alimony payments, See
Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P. 2d 1276, 1278 (Utah 1987),
alimony may not be automatically awarded whenever there is
disparity between the parties income."
In Newmeyer, 745 P.2d at 1297, the Supreme Court upheld the Trial
Court's award of one dollar per year alimony to Mrs.
-11-
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Case No. 920340-CA

The Court stated that although Mrs. Newmeyer had a

relatively poor ability to earn income sufficient to maintain as
nearly as possible the standard of living that the parties enjoyed
when

married,

worked

at

the

time

of

divorce,

but

only

"episodically' and at low paying jobs during the marriage and her
prospect for future earnings were not as great as Mr. Newmeyer's,
Mrs. Newmeyer had received a majority of the marital assets.

The

facts stated by the Court match those in this Ccise where Appellant
received not only one-half interest in the marital home, but all
the other marital assets the parties had accumulated.

R^_ p. 358,

362.
The Trial Court's denial of alimony was upheld by the Supreme
Court in another case.

In Walker v. Walker, 707 P. 2d 110, 113

(Utah 1985), the Court found that the wife had not shown a unique
need and even though her annual income of $11,000.00 was only about
half of the husband's annual income it was in the Trial Court's
discretion to deny the wife alimony. Walker would also support the
Trial Court's decision even if the Trial Court had completely
denied alimony to the Appellant.
Another factor which is determinative in this case is the
agreement made between the parties in which the Appellant agreed to
forego alimony in exchange for all marital assets. R_^ p. 358. In
Huck v. Huck, 734 P. 2d 417, 419 (Utah 1986), the Supreme Court

-12-

Case No. 920340-CA

HOAGLAND v. HOAGLAND
Appellee's Brief

states that the agreements of the parties are not binding on the
Court, but serve "as a recommendation". The Court stated in Nunley
v. Nunley, 737 P. 2d 473, 475 (Utah App. 1988), that agreements
between the parties should be "respected and given considerable
weight in the Court's determination of an equitable division."
Citing Clausen v. Clausen, 675 P. 2d 562, 564

(Utah 1983).

Therefore, the Trial Court had the discretion to follow the terms
of the agreement and deny Appellant any alimony.

Equally within

the Court's discretion, it divided the marital assets and awarded
alimony, which allows Appellant to enjoy a standard of living
similar to that she enjoyed during the marriage.
Other statements made by the Supreme Court support the Trial
Court's decision.

In English, 565 P.2d at 412 the Court states:

"This court ruled the trial court may properly consider a
husband's historical earning ability, when he has experienced
a temporary decrease in income, when determining the amount he
should contribute for the support and maintenance of his
family. This principle should be equally applicable, when the
husband's experience prospers during one year."
The purpose of using historical earnings is to prevent a
spouse from taking advantage of temporary circumstances in the
determination of alimony.

From the facts it could be observed by

the Court that the Appellant is an opportunist trying to cash-in on
the Appellees' post-separation financial success.
Financial contributions made by each of the parties to their
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joint financial success is a valid factor to influence the Trial
Court's award of alimony.

English, 565 P.2d at 412.

Here, the

Appellee not only substantially supported the parties, but also the
Appellant's

four minor

marriage. R^_ p. 356.

children

from

her

first

unsuccessful

Similarly, it was the Appellee who financed

the purchase of the 1978 Delta motor home that Appellant sold for
$9,000.00. Appellant's Exhibit 7. Appellee also left the $8,000.00
- $10,000.00 with Appellant when he moved to Nevada, and sent the
Appellant $15,500.00 for mortgage payments before the Appellant
filed

for divorce

and

contributed

a total

of

$25,337.00 to

Appellant between December, 1986 and the trial. R. p. 358, Tr. p.
100, 176.

These facts support the Trial Court's decision.

The Court

found

the Appellant

disabilities, R^ p. 360.

in good health, with no

However, she only works as a seasonal

employee of the Internal Revenue Service. Appellant went to great
lengths to give a detailed account of her work history and her
"persistent" struggle to obtain full time employment. Tr. pp. 4857, 104.

Appellant Exhibits 15, 23-30. Her age is offered as the

excuse for her inability to obtain full-time employment. However,
the Appellant did not attribute her failure to her lack of
education or training, which is the one action Appellant blatantly
refuses to do.

Tr. pp. 84-85.

The Appellee testified and the

Appellant acknowledges that the Defendant offered to pay tuition
and to financially support Appellant for several years so that she
-14-
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could get the education or training needed to become a self
supporting person.

Tr. pp. 103, 159.

In Reed v. Reed, 594 P. 2d 871, 872 (Utah 1979) citing Wilson
v. Wilson, 5 Utah 2d 79, 296 P. 2d 977 (Utah 1956), it states:
"The court may, and as a practical matter invariably does,
consider the relative loyalty or disloyalty of the parties to
their marriage vows, or the relative guilt or innocence in
causing the breaking of the marriage."
Findings of the Court demonstrate that the Court rightly
believed that the Appellee did desire and intend for the Appellant
to move to Nevada and for the marriage to continue. R^ p. 362. On
the other-hand, Appellant abandoned the Appellee when he needed her
the most. The grocery business had failed, and Appellee was forced
to move to another state and live in much less comfortable
circumstances

than he enjoyed

in Ogden, in order

employment to support the family.

to obtain

His ego shattered, his life a

mess, Appellant poured salt into his wounds by her refusal to move
to Nevada to be with the Appellee, stating the house he had in
Nevada did not compare with the home in Ogden.

Tr. p. 80, 161.

Under these circumstances, the Trial Court had discretion to
favorably treat the Appellee.
According to Howell v. Howell, 806 P. 2d 1209, 1211 (Utah App.
1991), a case upon which the Appellant so heavily relies, this
Court stated, "due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the
trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.

Utah R.

Civ. P. 52(a): Jense v. Jense, 784 P.2d 1249, 1251 (Utah Ct. App.
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HOAGLAND v. HOAGLAND
Appellee's Brief
1989)."
the

The preponderance of the evidence in this case supports

Court's

Appellee.
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apparent

credibility

judgement

in

favor

of

the

Consequently, the Court has the discretion to make

decisions which reflect its credibility judgement and favorably
treat the Appellees in the Court's subsequent decisions.
Appellant seems to believe that Howell is directly on point
with this case.

This is an erroneous application of Howell.

In

contrast to the Howell case, there were no children born of this
marriage which Appellant stayed home to raise. Even if it was only
part-time, the Appellant did work throughout most of the marriage,
while Mrs. Howell did not work. Also, the time between separation
and the divorce filing and the Divorce Decree is twice as long in
this case than in Howell.
The most important difference between the two cases deals with
employment of the husbands. Mr. Howell never changed his job. He
was a pilot for Western Airlines which was taken over by Delta
Airlines.

As a consequence of the takeover, Mr. Howell's income

doubled.

Howell 806 P.2d at 1210.

This Court found that his

salary increase was a type of "deferred income", even though as the
dissent states, there was no commitment from Western that Mr.
Howell's income "would increase if and because he stayed with the
airline."

_Id. at 1215, n.2.

But there is no way that the

Appellee's income can be considered deferred income.

Appellee

worked for Smith's, quit to start a family business which failed,
-16-
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then worked

for Smith's again.

Appellant's

contention that

Appellee's financial success was due to the experience of owning
his own stores is ludicrous.

Appellee was a store manager for

Smith's before the parties married and was promoted to district
manager only four months after the marriage.

Tr. p. 117.

The

Appellant testifies that during the time the parties owned their
own grocery business, Smith's repeatedly visited the store and
tried to convince Appellee to resume employment with Smith's. Tr,
p. 83.

Finally, when Appellee did return to work for Smith's he

was not made a store manager immediately.

Tr. p. 127. His post-

separation financial success was found by the Court to be a result
of his efforts after the separation.

R_^ p. 274.

When the Court held that the facts of Howell required a
determination of standard of living at the time of Trial rather
than at the time of separation, this Court wisely stated:
"In so concluding we do not intend to establish a rigid rule
which must be followed in all domestic cases, but acknowledge
that trial courts have discretion to determine the standard of
living which existed during the marriage after consideration
of all relevant facts and equitable principles."
Howell 806 P.2d at 1212
The principle applied in Howell is very fact specific and this
Court did not mention or apply Howell to two subsequent cases.
Rudman v. Rudman, 812 P. 2d 73, 76 (Utah App. 1991);
Roberts, 188 Utah Adv. Rep. 26, 28 (Utah App. 1992).
found where Howell was followed)
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Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P. 2d 1076

(Utah 1988) is

referred to by Appellant to show that alimony should try to
"equalize the parties respective standard of living enjoyed during
the marriage."

Here again it is important to note the requirement

"enjoyed during the marriage."

The Court also stated that Mrs.

Gardner had not worked for almost thirty years, and had actually
enjoyed the benefits of Mr. Gardner's $6,000.00 per month salary.
Also, the Court mentioned that the amount of alimony awarded by the
Trial Court was not sufficient to meet the needs of the monthly
expenses listed on an affidavit executed by Mrs. Gardner prior to
trial.

_Id. at 1081. All this drastically contrasts to the facts

of this case.
As the Trial Court accurately found, the Appellant did not
enjoy a high standard of living.

R^ p. 360. The Court found that

previous to the parties' business bankruptcy

and separation,

Appellant's take home pay was $500.00 per week.

R_^ p. 360.

The

exhibits admitted by both parties show that the average annual
income for the years 1983 to 1986 was $2,701.74. If 1987 income is
included,

the

annual

average

Appellant's Exhibit No. 17, 18,
17.

is

increased

to

$8,513.19.

Appellee's Exhibits No. 15, 16,

Appellant's current income of $9,780.00 or more is $1,266.81

more than the parties averaged from 1983 to 1987. With alimony and
her own income, Appellant will have an annual income of about
$22,000.00, "which is almost equal to that which the parties were
-18-
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living on when the Defendant was drawing $500.00 per week from his
business prior to separation of the parties, and represents a
monthly amount greater than the amounts set out in the Affidavit of
monthly expenses as filed by the Plaintiff."

R^ p. 364.

Two more cases are presented by the Appellant in an attempt to
show that alimony should be set to maintain "a standard of living
not unduly disproportionate to that which they would have enjoyed
had the marriage continued."

Savage v. Savage, 658 P. 2d 1201,

1205 (Utah 1983), see also Naranjo v. Naranjo, 751 P. 2d 1144, 1147
(Utah App. 1988).

It is worth noting that the Court in both cases

stated in the opinions that alimony should maintain the standard of
living "enjoyed during the marriage."
Naranjo

751 P.2d at 1146, 1147.

Savage, 658 P.2d at 1205;

(Emphasis added) Even so, these

two cases can be factually differentiated from this case to show
that "had the marriage continued" theory is inapplicable here.
In Savage, the husband had continued employment with the same
company throughout the marriage and divorce.
1202.

Savage 658 P.2d at

The wife remained a full-time homemaker and caretaker for

the parties' three children. _Id. at 1203. Additionally, the Court
found Mrs. Savage had enjoyed a high standard of living during the
marriage and that the alimony awarded by the Trial Court was just
barely over one-half of Mrs. Savage's monthly expenses.
1205.

Id. at

In Naranjo, the wife had been a full-time homemaker for the

sixteen years prior to the divorce while the husband had developed
-19-
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a successful trucking business.

Naranjo 751 P.2d at 1147.

Despite the wording of these two cases, the Trial Court did
not abuse its discretion in the amount of alimony awarded in this
case.

In Howell 806 P.2d at 1212, this Court stated that a Court

"can properly address what situation would have existed if the
parties had not separated earlier."

Appellant testified that the

only way the separation would not have occurred is if Appellee had
remained in Ogden.

Tr. p. 82.

Appellee did not receive a job

offer from Smith's to work in Utah.

Tr. p. 162.

The only job

offer Appellee received in the Ogden area was a job as freight
unloader/stocker with Harmon's earning seven dollars an hour. Tr.
p. 162.

The standard of living that the Appellant would have

enjoyed if the separation had not occurred earlicsr, or if there was
no divorce, would be a very minimal standard of living, which
standard the Appellant surpasses with her current income plus the
alimony awarded by the Trial Court.
Judicial economy does not necessarily require that the Court
use the standard of living of the parties at the time of the trial
to determine the amount of alimony.

When the Trial Court awards

alimony, it is presented with all the facts relevant to the case,
including the standard of living actually enjoyed by the parties
before the separation of the parties and the standard of living
they enjoyed at the time of trial.

Any material change in

circumstances prior to the divorce will be considered and included
-20-
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in the Court's decision, and any future changes in the alimony
award will be because the Trial Court abused its discretion, not
simply becuase of a pretrial material change of circumstances.
Consequently, judicial economy is achieved regardless of which
standard of living is used.
Cases have been cited by Appellant to show that the value of
marital assets be determined at the time of trial.
Berger, 713 P.2d 695, 697 (Utah 1985);
Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218 (Utah 1980).

See also

Berger v.
Fletcher v.

The implication is that the

standard of living must also be determined at the time of trial.
However, this Court points out in Howell, 806 P.2d at 1211, the
"courts can, however, in the exercise of their equitable powers,
use a different date, such as the date of separation, if one party
has 'acted obstructively,
1052 (Utah App. 1987).

f

" citing Peck v.Peck, 738 P.2d 1050,

The Trial Court has the discretion to

equitably determine the value of marital property, as well as the
standard of living at the time of separation.

The facts in this

case support the Trial Court's equitable determination that the
applicable standard of living was that which the parties enjoyed at
the time of their separation. Appellant did not meet the burden of
proof to show the findings were "clearly erroneous."

Riche v.

Riche, 784 P.2d 465, 468 (Utah App. 1989); citing Matter of Estate
of Bartell, 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989) (quoting State v. Walker,
743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987).
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II. IT WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO
DECLARE THE HOME, CURRENTLY TITLED IN THE APPELLANT'S NAME, AS
MARITAL PROPERTY TO BE DIVIDED.
The general rule is that "property acquired after {Marriage}
is marital property*" Walters v. Walters, 812 P. 2d 64, 68 (Utah
App. 1991).

In the distribution of property in a divorce, the

trial court has "wide discretion", Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P. 2d
1218,

1222 (Utaft 1980), and its decisions will not be disturbed

unless it is clearly unjust or a clear abuse of discretion. Gardner
v. Gardner, 748 P. 2d 1076, 1078 (Utah 1988).

Appellant has the

burden to show arror. Berger v.Berger, 713 P. 2d 695, 697 (Utah
1985).
The Trial Court properly found the family residence to be a
marital asset, and the Appellant's interest in the partnership was
found to have no equity.

R_^ p. 361.

Although, Appellant denies

any knowledge of this fact, in view of all the stress due to the
bankruptcy it is "highly unlikely" that Appellant

didn"t know.

Secondly, the Quit-Claim Deed, the incorporation, and the corporate
bankruptcy all occurred in a short period of time.

Another fact

which supports the Court's decision is that the $8000 - $10,000
received and kept by Appellant as a share of the stores' cash onhand at the time of the corporation bankruptcy was given to both
Appellant and Appellee.

R^ p. 358.

Appellant testified that the

money was to "be split between Colin and I, for us together".
p. 18.

Tr.

Perhaps the most convincing evidence to the Trial Court's

decision comes from the Appellant herself.
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discussion between the parties which occurred after the Quit Claim
Deed

was

testimony,

executed,

the Appellant

repeatedly

"We have a house in Ogden."

states, in her

Tr. pp 79, 80, 81.

Obviously, Appellant considered the home to be a marital asset.
A case which has many similarities to the case at hand is
Hogue v. Hogue, 184 Utah Adv. Rep 63 (Utah App. 1992).

In Hogue,

Mr. Hogue purchased a ranch with his own money after his divorce
from Mrs. Hogue.

Later Mr. Hogue conveyed, by Quit-Claim Deed,

sole ownership of the ranch to Mrs. Hogue. The next month Mr. and
Mrs. Hogue were remarried.

The second divorce decree, which was

upheld by the Appellate Court, declared the ranch to be a marital
asset,

Id, at 64.

Appellant would have this Court believe that the court in
Hogue was correct when it found the ranch was marital property, but
then argues it would be an abuse of discretion to find the home,
marital property, in this case.
without merit.

The argument of Appellant is

The general rule that property acquired during a

marriage is marital property applies to this case, since the home
was purchased while the parties were married. It is inapplicable to
Hogue, however, because the ranch was purchased by Mr. Hogue while
he was single; between his two marriages to Mrs. Hogue.

Equally

illogical, is Appellant's assertion that the Quit-Claim signed by
Mr. Hogue has less validity than the Quit-Claim Deed signed by
Appellee. If one Quit-Claim Deed has more validity than the other,
-23-
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then Mr. Hogue's quit-claim deed would be more valid.

Mr. Hogue

purchased the ranch while he was single, had sole ownership of the
property, and had not yet remarried Mrs. Hogue when he executed the
Quit-Claim Deed to her.

Whereas, in this case, the parties

purchased the home during the marriage, had joint ownership of the
home, and Appellee executed the quit claim deed to his spouse, the
Appellant.
When a Trial Court must distribute property in a divorce a
factor that affects the Courts' decision is the credibility of the
witnesses.

Howell

806 P.2d at 1211. In addition to the issues

previously discussed regarding the credibility of the Appellant's
testimony, a few other discrepencies in her testimony may have
influenced the Courts' decisions.

First, Appellant emphatically

denies that the Quit-claim Deed was signed to protect the home from
the business creditors' claims, yet she readily admits that the
title to the Lincoln automobile was signed over to Appellant's
daughter for that very reason,

Tr. pp. 86 & 88. Appellant admits

that it was a smart thing to do. Tr. p 88.

Another example is

Appellant's statement that Appellee said at the time of conveyance
that he wanted out of "her" house.

Tr. pp. 32, 87. But Appellee

stayed in "her" house for another seven months and moved out only
because he was forced to move to Las Vegas, Nevada in order to get
a decent job.

Tr. pp. 162, 83. Appellant claims that she was a

partner in the grocery business and that Appellee executed the
-24-
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Quit- Claim Deed in exchange for her interest in the partnership.
Tr. pp. 28, 32, 87.

Yet, when asked who were partners in the

business, Appellant omits herself as a partner.

Tr. p. 26, 27.

Lastly, the Appellant stated that the bankruptcy was "from our
business" (emphasis added), not Appellee's business.

Tr. p. 19.

As previously discussed, loyalty or disloyalty of the parties
to the marriage may properly be considered by the Trial Court.
Reed, 594 P.2d at 872.

This principle is equally or even more

applicable to the distribution of marital property than it is to
the determination of alimony. Appellant should not be rewarded by
receiving sole ownership in the family residence when it is
Appellant that cruelly abandoned Appellee.
Judicial, or Quasi Estoppel, is not applicable to this case.
The bankruptcy filed in November, 1986 was a corporate bankruptcy.
Since Appellee refused to sign the lien as requested by the Utah
Bank and Trust, Tr. p. 122, there was no claim by the corporation's
creditors against the marital residence so Appellee did not have to
disclaim his interest in the house.

Furthermore, there was no

attempt by any creditor to set aside the corporate identity as a
"sham", so the personal assets of the parties were never a part of
the bankruptcy.
obtained

Tr. p. 123.

Consequently, the Appellee never

any relief in a previous action by disclaiming his

interest in the home so the Appellant's claim of Judicial or Quasi
Estoppel is totally without merit.
-25-
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any way undermine the Trial Courts' position that the Quit-Claim
Deed was solely for the purpose of protecting the marital residence
from the claims of business creditors.

The parties fears of the

impending bankruptcy and the possibility of an attempt to pierce
the corporate veil were real and it was logical and reasonable for
the parties to put as much distance, as possible, between the
business

creditors and the parties ownership of the marital

residence. These circumstances, the potential bankruptcy, explains
why Appellant was never made an officer or director of the
corporation, and also why she was requested not to come to work at
the business for several weeks before the bankruptcy was filed.
Tr. p. 120.
Even if Appellee had actually disclaimed any interest in the
marital residence in the corporation's bankruptcy, which he did
not, there are defenses to Appellant's argument of Judicial and
Quasi Estoppel.

In Hogue, Mr. Hogue filed for bankruptcy under

Chapter 7 and claimed no interest in the ranch.

This occurred

three years after the Quit-Claim Deed to Mrs. Hogue. Hogue, p. 64.
Neither the Trial Court nor the Appellate Court had a problem with
Judicial

and

Quasi

Estoppel

and

declared

the

ranch

marital

property. If these doctrines were not applicable in Hogue they are
even less applicable here, because in this case the bankruptcy was
corporate not personal, as in Hogue.
Another valid defense exists to Appellant's claim of Judicial
-26-
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or Quasi Estoppel.

There is a well established rule in Utah that

"an appellant cannot raise a theory on appeal for the first time
different from that presented to trial court." First Equity Corp.
of Florida v. Utah State Univ., 544 P. 2nd 887 (Utah 1975); see
also Ream v. Fitzen, 581 P. 2d 145 (Utah 1978); Bullock v. Joe
Bailey Auction Co., 580 P. 2d 225, (Utah 1978); Hanover Ltd. v.
Fields, 568 P. 2d 751 (Utah 1977); Nelson v. Newman, 583 P. 2d 601
(Utah 1978).

Nowhere in the pleadings of record, or in the trial

transcript did the Appellant assert the theory of Judicial or Quasi
Estoppel.

Therefore, Appellant is barred from asserting these

theories on appeal.

Failure of the Court to address this theory

was not an abuse of the Court's discretion since it was not the
responsibility of the Court to argue Appellant's case.
Finally, if the Court had found the Quit-claim deed valid and
that Appellant had sole ownership of the home, the Trial Court
still has the discretion to declare the home marital property. If
Appellant did receive sole ownership of the family residence it was
during the marriage and under the general rule the family residence
would be considered marital property.

There are ample Utah

precedents that state that even when a party brings separate
property into a marriage it may be declared marital property if the
other spouse has, through his or her own, "contributed to the
enhancement, maintenance, or protection of that property, thereby
acquiring an equitable interest in it."
-27-
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804 P.2d 530, 535 (Utah App. 1990); citing Mortensen v. Mortensen,
760 P.2d 304, 308 (Utah 1988); Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1169
(Utah App. 1990); Dubois v. Dubois, 29 Utah 2d 75, 504 P.2d 1380,
1381 (Utah 1973).

State of title is not binding on the Court when

it determines what property is part of the marital estate.

Smith

v. Smith, 738 P.2d 655, 657 (Utah App. 1987); Huck: v. Huck, 734 P.
2d 417, 420 (Utah 1986);
(Utah 1982);
1980).

Workman v. Workman, 652 P. 2d 931, 933

Jackson v. Jackson, 617 P. 2d 338, 340-41 (Utah

The overriding consideration of the disposition of the

marital assets is that it is fair and equitable. Newmeyer 745 P.2d
at 1278. Equity demands that the residence be held by the court to
be a marital asset.

III. IT WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO DENY
APPELLANT AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES.
Section 30-3-3 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, allows
a trial court to award attorney fees in divorce proceedings.

On

the question of attorney's fees, the Utah Court of Appeals has
stated:

"If either financial need or resonableness has not been

shown, we have reversed awards of attorney's fees."
Haumont 793 P.2d 421, 426 (Utah App. 1990).

Haumont v.

"Where insufficient

evidence is presented on the reasonableness of the requested
attorney's fees or the financial need of the receiving spouse, no
fees are awarded."
1991).

Hagen v. Hagen, 810 P.2d 478, 484 (Utah App.

Ordinarily, when fees in a divorce were awarded below to
-28-
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the party who then prevailed on appeal, fees will also be awarded
to that party on appeal.

Conversely, when they were not awarded

below, we will not generally award them on appeal, except when a
party

has

presented

circumstances."

a

well-supported

claim

of

changed

Burt v. Burt, 799 P. 2d 1166, 1171 (Utah App.

1990).
The award of attorney's fees must be based upon three factors:
"One, evidence of financial need of the receiving spouse; Two, the
ability of the other spouse to pay; and Three, the reasonableness
of requested fees." Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P. 2d 1331, 1337 (Utah
App. 1988). Appellant contends that the Trial Court's findings are
inadequate and that financial need exists on the part of the
Appellant.
A.

THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS ARE ADEQUATE.

The Trial Court did make adequate findings. The findings are
found in the Second Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
dated May 7, 1992. Regarding Appellant's contention that the Trial
Court's findings in this case are inadequate, this Court has
stated:
"A footnote in a recent Utah Supreme Court Case suggests that,
where there are no findings, or where the findings are
inadequate, the general rule requires us to affirm whenever it
would be reasonable to find facts to support a given
conclusion. State v. Ramirez 817 P. 2d 774, 787, n. 6, (Utah
1991)
Rule 52(c) permits findings and conclusions to be
waived under certain circumstances except in divorce actions,
lending further support for the requirement that findings must
be made by the trial court in a divorce action
if we were
to infer findings where there are none, as suggested by
-29-
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Ramirez,
it would be only reasonable to place the burden on
the one challenging the implied findings and the resulting
conclusion to marshal1 the evidence in support of such
findings and to show how the evidence, viewed in the light
most favorable to the trial court, is nevertheless
insufficient to support the implied findings.
Doelle
v.
Bradley,
784 P. 2d 1176, 1178 (Utah 1989).
Without this
requirement, the burden on the appellate courts to go through
volumes of transcripts and exhibits in search of evidence
supporting the implied findings would be prohibitive. It
would also place the reviewing court in the untenable position
of second guessing the trial court's reasons for finding as it
did without the advantage of observing witnesses first hand
and assessing their credibility." Rudman v. Rudman, 812 P.2d
73, 76 (Utah App. 1991).
The footnote in Rudman would indicate that the Appellant in
this case needed to marshal the evidence in support of the findings
and to show how the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to
the Trial Court, is nevertheless insufficient to support the
findings and conclusions of law rendered by the Trial Court.
Rudman is not the only divorce case which holds that the Appellant
must marshal the evidence:
"However, Husband does not fmarshal1 the evidence in support
of the findings and then demonstrate that despite this
evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in support
as to be "against the clear weight of the evidence, ' thus
making them "clearly erroneous.'" Riche vr Riche, 784 P.2d
465, 468 (Utah App. 1989).
In spite of the requirement to marshal the evidence, Appellant
has only argued the facts favorable to her case, while ignoring the
Trial Court's findings, similar to the following case:
[Plaintiff] "has not even attempted to marshall the evidence
in support of the trial court's findings, nor has she
attempted to demonstrate that the trial court's findings are
against the clear weight of the evidence, as required by
Walker. Instead, she has essentially reargued the factual
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case submitted below, construing all evidence in a light most
favorable to her case and largely ignoring the evidence
supportive of the trial court's findings. This leads us to
rely heavily on the presumption of correctness that attends
these findings under Rule 52(a)."
Matter of Estate of
Bartell, 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989)
B.

IN ANY EVENT, THE TRIAL COURT'S ANALYSIS WAS SOUND,
BASED ON THE EVIDENCE SET FORTH IN THE RECORD.

The evidence as found by the Trial Court included the amounts
of money that Appellant would have at her disposal in order to pay
her attorney's fees, which are:

the seasonal employment with the

Internal Revenue Service including unemployment compensation at
over $9,780.00 per year;

$400.00 per month in alimony, plus

$600.00 per month against the substantial arrearage in alimony
amounting to $27,507.00; $9,000.00 from the sale of the motor home
by Appellant; $8,000.00 or $9,000.00 in cash left by the Appellee
for the benefit of Appellant; the first $19,672.00 from the sale of
the marital house valued at $85,000.00 to $97,000.00; one half of
the balance of the proceeds from the sale of the parties' residence
representing another $35,000.00 plus to Appellant; and essentially
all of the other marital assets. The evidence clearly establishes
that Appellant has no financial need for assistance in paying her
attorney's

fees.

To the contrary, the evidence

shows that

Appellant has the financial resources to pay her attorney's fees.
And it is fair and equitable that she do so.
The Utah Supreme Court and the Utah Court of Appeals have held
in two separate cases that the Trial Court record disclosed
sufficient evidence regarding financial need:
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"Evidence of defendant's need for assistance in paying her
attorney fees unfolded during the entire trial, so a special
proceeding specifically concerned with determination of her
need is not necessary.
The Utah Supreme Court similarly
concluded in Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P. 2d 1276, 1279 (Utah
1987), stating: "because ample evidence of [the wife's]
financial condition was before the court we reject [the
husband's] argument that the trial court's finding of need was
unsupported by the evidence.'" Porco v. Porco, 752 P.2d 365,
368 (Utah App. 1988)
"Plaintiff also contends that the district court erred in not
ordering defendant to pay her attorney's fees, and she
requests attorney's fees for the purposes of this appeal. An
award of attorney's fees is largely discretionary with the
court, and as the record shows that plaintiff is working and
earning money, and does not disclose any necessity on the part
of plaintiff for such award, or her inability to pay her own
attorney's fees, we do not find any abuse of the court's
discretion in its denial of such fees. Attorney's fees on
appeal are denied for the same reason." Adams v. Adams, 593
P. 2d 147, 149 (Utah 1979).
In this case Appellant is working and earning money from her
seasonal employment with the Internal Revenue Service. When she is
not

working

with

the

I.R.S.,

she

receives

unemployment

compensation, all of which totals in excess of $9,780.00 per year.
The findings in the Trial Court, as found by the* Honorable Ronald
0. Hyde District Judge, indicated that her list of monthly expenses
reflected a desire on her part to obtain high alimony rather than
reasonably advising the court as to her actual needs.
Appellant

If, as the

contends, the Trial Court's findings are deficient

because they fail to evaluate the Appellant's financial need, it is
reasonable to conclude that the Trial Court found that Appellant
did not have any financial need for an award for attorney's fees to
be paid.

This Court emphasized the need for specific findings:
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"We therefore remand the issue of fees for specific findings
regarding the financial needs for Mrs. Rudman. In the event
the court on remand determines that need exists, the court
should then make findings as to the reasonableness of .... the
attorney fees."
Rudman,
812 P. 2d 73, at 77.
(emphasis
added).
The

Trial

Court

did

make

specific

findings

regarding

Appellant's financial need, which are discussed below.
It would seem reasonable that the Trial Court determined that
Appellant's financial condition did not require that her attorney's
fees be paid by the Appellee.

If the Trial Court had made a

finding that need existed, then the Trial Court would have made
findings regarding the reasonableness of her attorney's fees.
C.

APPELLANT/PLAINTIFF HAS NOT PRESENTED
EVIDENCE OF HER FINANCIAL NEED.

SUFFICIENT

Factor Two in the awarding of attorney's fees is the ability
of

the

other

spouse

to

pay.

The

Trial

Court

analyzed

and

considered Appellee's ability to pay Appellant's attorney's fees
and found that after the bankruptcies, the Appellee

reobtained

employment with Smith's and became a store manager, but he later
developed rheumatoid arthritis and had to down grade his job to
that of a buyer.
Regarding

Factor

One,

evidence

of

financial

need

of

the

receiving spouse, the Trial Court found that the Appellee had left
in the possession of the Appellant

approximately

$8,000.00 to

$10,000.00 in cash and the motor home of the parties, which at a
later time the Appellant sold for $9,000.00 cash, which she also

-33-

HOAGLAND v. HOAGLAND
Appellee's Brief
retained entirely.

Casse No. 920340-CA

The Appellee also left with the Appellant all

of the house furnishings, furniture, the house and lot with
swimming pool, a 1980 Lincoln Town Car, and a 1976 Chevrolet, of
which she has had sole control and use since December of 1986. The
Court also found that none of the $8,000.00 to $10,000.00 cash or
the $9,000.00 received by the Appellant from sale of the motor home
was shared by Appellant with the Appellee.
The Trial Court

also found

that Appellant

is currently

employed as she has been for some time, with the United States
Treasury Department, Internal Revenue Service, as a GS-5 step 1,
with a part time gross pay of $8,280.00 plus unemployment for ten
weeks giving her a total gross yearly income of $9,780.00.

In

addition, the Court found that Appellant
testified that she would receive an increased income from her
employment in 1992.

The Court also found that Appellant's health

is good and she suffers no disabilities.
Furthermore, the Trial Court found:
"that Plaintiff [Appellant] filed an Affidavit of Monthly
Expenses showing present monthly expenses of $1796.00 per
month; however, Plaintiff's claims, of her expenses, is more
a "wish list than a needs list'.
An example of that fact is that her transportation expense
list shows $531.00 for transportation expense though her
testimony is that she drives very little. She also indicates
that her personal expenses of $270.00 per month includes
recreation and travel of over $130.00, and she testified that
she does not travel and that she spends very little money on
recreation. In addition, she recites that her personal food
expenses totaled $350.00 per month which is not a realistic
sum to spend for one person, and reflects a desire on the part
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of the Plaintiff to obtain high alimony rather than reasonably
advising the Court of the Plaintiff's actual expenses."
See Finding No. 23 in the Second Amended Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, by Ronald 0. Hyde, Judge, dated May 7, 1992.
The Trial Court, in its Conclusions of Law stated that the
house and lot should be sold, and that from the net sale proceeds
the Appellant should be awarded the first $19,672.00 without
interest, representing Appellant's equity from her prior home,
prior to the marriage of the parties, and the balance of the
remaining equity should be divided, one-half to the Appellant, and
one-half to the Appellee.

The house and lot had been appraised

twice for $97,000.00 and $85,000.00. The Court also concluded that
there was delinquent alimony owed to the Appellant in the sum of
$27,507.00, that the Appellant should be awarded ongoing alimony,
and that the Appellee should pay to the Appellant the sum of
$600.00 per month in liquidation of the delinquent alimony sum of
$27,507.00 which the Court calculated will take 45.845 months and
that the Appellee should not be required to pay interest on the
delinquent alimony.

The Court also concluded that neither party

had much retirement benefits accumulated, but each should have an
interest in the other's retirement per the Woodward v. Woodward
formula.

Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982)

In addition, the Court concluded:
"The Plaintiff [Appellant] in receiving $12,000.00 a year for
3.8 years from the Defendant, plus her current earnings on a
part time basis of $9,780.00, or more, will provide Plaintiff
with a gross income of almost $22,000.00 per year which is
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almost equal to the income both parties were living on when
the Defendant was drawing $500.00 per week from his business
prior to the separation of the parties, and represents a
monthly amount greater than the amounts set out in the
Affidavit of Monthly Expenses as filed by the Plaintiff.
Therefore, the Plaintiff and the Defendant should each pay
their own attorney's fees and costs." See Conclusion of Law
No. 14, Second Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, dated May 7, 1992.
It is apparent that the Trial Court considered that the
Appellant's financial need was in question. The Trial Court Judge
stated in his Memorandum Decision and in the Second Amended
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, that the Appellant's
Affidavit of Monthly Expenses was made more "with the view to
obtain high alimony than to advising the Court of her actual
expenses."

It seems reasonable to conclude that the Trial Court

thought that Appellant had inflated claimed expenses to indicate a
financial need greater than existed, or perhaps where none existed.
The Appellant in this case has adequate resources to pay her
attorney's

fees

as

found

by

the

Trial

Court.

The

findings

adequately show that Appellant has no financial need for an award
of attorney's fees and that both parties are able to pay for their
own attorney's fees:
"Wife requests attorney fees at trial and on appeal. Attorney
fee determinations at trial lie within the trial court's sound
discretion. Munns v. Munns 790 P. 2d 116, 123 (Utah App.
1990). Consequently, we will not disturb the court's finding
that "both parties are capable of paying the same, because we
find no abuse of discretion.'" Roberts v. Roberts, 188 Utah
Adv. Rep. 26, at 29 (Utah App. 1992).
In a 1990 case, this Court held that a substantial judgment
for arrearages in alimony could be used to satisfy payment of
-36-

Case No. 920340-CA

HOAGLAND v. HOAGLAND
Appellee's Brief
attorney's fees.

The Trial Court heard evidence on need and chose

not to award the wife attorney's fees and costs.

In its opinion

the Utah Court of Appeals stated the following:
"Wife does not challenge the court's denial of attorney's fees
below nor does she assert on appeal any facts in addition to
those presented to the trial court concerning her financial
need. She does not claim her situation has deteriorated since
the trial....furthermore, the wife was awarded a substantial
judgment for arrearages in alimony which could be used to
satisfy her fees." Bagshaw v. Bagshaw, 788 P.2d 1057, 1062
(Utah App. 1990).
As in Bagshaw, this Appellant has received a substantial
judgment for arrearages in alimony which could be used to satisfy
her attorney's fees.
Court

did not

abuse

It is reasonable to conclude that the trial
its discretion

in determining

that the

Appellant has adequate financial resources to pay her attorney's
fees.

IV. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING JUDGMENT INTEREST ON
PAYMENTS TO APPELLANT UPON A JUDGMENT FOR TEMPORARY ALIMONY AWARDED
TO HER PRIOR TO THE TRIAL HEREIN.
Argument

A.

I.

THE "JUDGMENT" REFERRED TO BY APPELLANT IS NOT
A FINAL JUDGMENT FOR PURPOSES OF SECTION 15-1-4
OF THE UTAH CODE.

THE "JUDGMENT" FOR TEMPORARY ALIMONY AS REFERRED TO
BY APPELLANT, IS ENTITLED "RECOMMENDED ORDER ON ORDER
TO SHOW CAUSE AND ORDER" DATED MAY, 1991 AND IS NOT
A FINAL JUDGMENT. IT IS AN INTERLOCUTORY ORDER.

Appellant contends that past due alimony in the amount of
$21,935.00 was reduced to "judgment" at a hearing held in May in
1991.

The hearing regarding the past due temporary alimony was
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held on April 30, 1991 before the Honorable Maurice Richards,
domestic relations commissioner, who presented recommendations to
the

Honorable

Ronald

0.

Hyde,

District

Judge.

Those

recommendations were embodied in a "Recommended Order on Order to
Show Cause and Order." Appellee (Defendant) asserts that the Order
entitled "Recommended Order on Order to Show Cause and Order" is
not a final judgment for purposes of appeal. Appellee asserts that
the Order is interlocutory, which means that it is not a final
decision of the whole controversy; it merely determines one point
in the cause of action, and only decides some intervening matter
pertaining to the cause, which requires some further steps to be
taken in order to enable the Court to adjudicate the entire cause
of action on the merits.

An order is not a final judgment when

claims and issues remain pending in the trial court:
"For purposes of appeal, * final judgment' is one which ends
litigation and leaves no claim remaining for resolution."
Tippets v. Page Petroleum, Inc., 738 P. 2d 635 (Utah 1987).
In this case, the "Recommended Order on Order to Show Cause
and Order" was an interlocutory order and is not a final judgment
because the divorce decree had not been executed or entered by the
Trial Court.

The Order is not a final judgment because claims

regarding other divorce issues were pending in the Trial Court.
The "Recommended Order on Order to Show Cause and Order," for
temporary alimony, referred to by Appellant as a judgment, is not
a final judgment but is an interlocutory order.
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IN ANY EVENT, WHETHER SAID ORDER IS INTERLOCUTORY OR
IS A FINAL JUDGMENT, APPELLANT DID NOT COMPLY WITH
THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND THE UTAH RULES
OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE.

Rule 54 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states:
(a) "judgment" as used in these rules includes a decree and
any order from which an appeal lies.
A judgment need not
contain a recital of pleadings, the report of a master, or the
record of prior proceedings, (b) When more then one claim for
relief is presented in an action, .... the court may direct
the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than
all of the claims or parties only upon an expressed
determination by the court that there is no just reason for
delay and upon an expressed direction for the entry of
judgment. In the absence of such determination and direction,
any order or other form of decision, however designated, which
adjudicates fewer than all the claims or all the rights and
liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate
the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order
or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject
to revision at any time before the entry of judgment
adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of
all the parties." Utah R. Civ. P. 54.
In this case the "Recommended Order on Order to Show Cause and
Order" did not have an express determination by the Court that
there was no just reason for delay and did not have an express
direction for the entry of judgment.

As such, the "Recommended

Order on Order to Show Cause and Order" is not a final judgment for
purposes of Rule 54.
Rule 58A(c) and (d) state:
11

A judgment is complete and shall be deemed entered for all
purposes, ....when the same is signed and filed as herein
above provided. The clerk shall immediately make a notation
of the judgment in the Register of Actions and the Judgment
Docket. The prevailing party shall promptly give notice of
the signing or entry of the judgment to all other parties and
shall provide proof of service of such notice with the clerk
of the court
" Utah R. Civ. P. 58A.
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If the Appellant considered the "Recommended Order on Order to
Show Cause and Order" as a final judgment, Appellant did not have
the clerk make a notation of the judgment in the Register of
Actions and the Judgment Docket.

Neither did the Appellant

promptly give notice of the signing or entry of judgment to other
parties and file proof of service of such notice with the clerk of
the court.
The Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 4(a) states:
"In a case in which an appeal is permitted as a matter of
right from the trial court to the appellate court, the notice
of appeal required by rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of
the trial court within 30 days after the date of entry of the
judgment or order appealed from."
Rule 5(a): "An appeal from an interlocutory order may be
sought by any party by filing a petition for permission to
appeal the interlocutory order with the clerk of the appellate
court with jurisdiction over the case within 20 days after the
entry of the order of the trial court, with proof of service
on all other parties to the action." Utah R. App. P. 4,5.
If Appellant considered the "Recommended Order on Order to
Show Cause and Order" to be a judgment or an interlocutory order,
on which right of appeal did exist, Appellant did not file the
proper notice of appeal within the required number of days.

For

judicial economy and to save time, Appellant has appealed this
particular "Order" with her appeal of the divorce decree.

It is

reasonable to conclude that Appellant did not consider the "Order"
as a final judgment and waited to appeal the "Recommended Order on
Order to Show Cause and Order" until the Memorandum Decision and
Decree of Divorce were executed and entered by the Trial Court.
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Therefore, the "Recommended Order on Order to Show Cause and Order"
is not a final judgment.
"The final judgment rule, which underlies what is now Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure 3, precludes a party from taking
an Appeal from any orders or judgments that are not final.
However, there are exceptions to the final judgment rule when
the order in question is eligible for certification under Utah
Rule of Civil Procedure, 54(b) and has been properly certified
or when we have given permission in advance to the parties to
take an appeal from an interlocutory order under Utah Rule of
Appellate Procedure 5. [Citations omitted]. Here, because the
order appealed from was not final and was not certified nor
eligible for certification under Rule 54(b), it was not
properly taken." A.J. Mackay Co. v. Okland Const. Co., 817 P.
2d 323, 325 (Utah 1991).
The "Recommended Order on Order to Show Cause and Order" is
not a final judgment, according to the Utah Rules of Appellate
procedure.

Appellant neither certified the "Order" nor received

permission to appeal the "Order". As stated in Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, Rule 54, this particular Order was not a final Order at
the time it was rendered.

The Order was not final for the simple

reason that other claims and issues in the case were pending before
the Trial Court. Therefore, the "judgment" received in May of 1991
was merged into the divorce decree.
C.

IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SAID ORDER WAS IMPROPERLY
EXECUTED AND IS THEREFORE, DEFECTIVE.

The "Recommended Order on Order to Show Cause and Order" may
not be considered a final judgment because it is defective.

As

stated above, the hearing was held on April 30th, 1991, and the
recommendations were signed by the Domestic Relations Commissioner
on May 20, 1991. A Notice attached to the Order indicates that the
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Appellee had ten days from May 9, 1991 to file any written
objections and the document was dated and mailed May 10, 1991. Ten
days from that date would be the 19th or 20th of May, 1991.
However, there is also the Order itself which states:
"That ten days having expired since the date of hearing,
defendant [appellee] failed to file any objections, it is
hereby ordered that said recommendations be and are hereby
approved and ordered."
Ten days from the date of hearing would be May 10, 1991. But
the Order was signed by Ronald 0. Hyde, District Court Judge on May
8, 1991. The "Recommended Order on Order to Show Cause and Order"
was filed on May 28, and entered May 29, 1991. It is obvious that
since the Judge signed the Order on May 8, and ten days for the
Notice expires on May 19 or May 20, of 1991, and ten days from
hearing expires on May 10, 1991, that the Order is defective.
During the time that the appeal was in process, Appellee's
Counsel made a call to the clerk of the Second District Court
inquiring about exhibits and also inquiring about dates on this
particular

Order.

Appellee's Counsel was informed

that the

signature of the Judge was May 8, of 1991. When the Pleadings were
received by this office in September, 1992, it was apparent that
someone

had

altered

the date on the Order

attached

"Recommended Order on Order to Show Cause and Order".

to the

A "2" had

been inserted in front of the "8" on the dateline of the Order,
making the date of the Order to appear to be May 28, 1991. A copy
of the altered Order is included with this brief.
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Argument II. ALIMONY IS NOT GOVERNED BY SECTION 30-3-10.6 OF
THE UTAH CODE.
Section 30-3-10.6 of the Utah Code Annotated reads:
"(1) each payment or installment of child or spousal support
under any child support order as defined by subsection 62A-11401(3) is, on and after the date it is due:
(a) A judgment with the same attributes and effect of any
judgment of a district court, ....
(b) Entitled, as a judgment, to full faith and credit in
this and in any other jurisdiction; ...." Section 30-310.6 Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended.
Section 62A-11-401 of the Utah Code defines what

"child

support order" means:
"(3) "Child Support Order1 means a judgment, decree, or order
of a court or administrative body whether interlocutory or
final, whether or not prospectively or retroactively
modifiable, whether incidental to a proceeding for a divorce,
judicial or legal separation, separate maintenance, paternity,
guardianship, civil protection, or otherwise, which:
(a) establishes or modifies child support;
(b) reduces child support arrearages to judgment; or
(c) establishes child support or confirms a child support
order under Chapter 31, Title 77." Section 62A-11-401,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended.
Section 30-3-10.6 refers to child support or spousal support
under any child support order, as defined by Section 62A-11-401 of
the Utah Code.
the Appellant

Alimony is not governed by Section 30-3-10.6, as
contends.

Appellant

argues that

Whitehead v.

Whitehead, 193 Utah Adv. Rep. 8 (Utah App. 1992), requires that
interest must be awarded on temporary alimony arrearages. But the
Appellant misreads Whitehead, because only child and spousal
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support payments are governed by section 30-3-10.6 which is defined
by subsection 62A-11-401(3). Alimony itself is covered in another
section of the Whitehead opinion. The Court does not connect child
and spousal support payments with alimony in the opinion.
Appellant also cites Stroud v. Stroud 738 P.2d 649 (Utah
1987), aff'd 758 P.2d 905 (Utah 1988), as a case to show that
interest should be allowed on temporary alimony granted before the
divorce decree.

In

the Stroud case, plaintiff, Karen Stroud,

asked the Court to issue an Order to Show Cause why judgment should
not be entered against the defendant for past due child support*
Plaintiff, Karen Stroud and Defendant James Stroud were divorced on
June 20, 1972.

The decree had ordered defendant to pay child

support of $75.00 per child per month. On September 20, 1983, the
Trial Court issued an Order to Show Cause why judgment should not
be entered against defendant for past due child support. The Trial
Court found in favor of the plaintiff and ordered defendant to pay
her $18,815.00 in principle and interest plus attorney's fees and
court costs, with interest on the unpaid balance to accrue at 12%
per annum until paid.

Defendant asked the court to prohibit the

accrual of interest on the unpaid judgment provided he remained
current on his payments.

However the Court could not waive the

interest on the judgment.
Appellant in the instant case, compares the Stroud case with
the facts herein before the Court to claim interest on temporary
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alimony to be awarded before the divorce decree and to be governed
by a child support order statute.

This is clearly not the law.

Appellant is urging this court to award pre-judgment interest
on alimony arrearages which occurred before the trial date, and
before the divorce decree was entered.

Section 30-3-10.6 is not

applicable to alimony, but only child and spousal support payments
under a child support order.
Argument III.

INTEREST SHOULD NOT BE AWARDED ON PAST DUE
TEMPORARY ALIMONY PAYMENTS BEFORE THE DIVORCE
DECREE IS ENTERED.

There is persuasive law which states that interest should not
be awarded on temporary alimony ordered before the divorce decree
is entered.
In Dube v. Dube, plaintiff attempted to revive a temporary
alimony order granted 3 years before the final divorce decree was
filed.

The Court ruled that the temporary order was not a final

judgment capable of being revived and stated:
"Temporary alimony or support is also referred to as alimony
pendente lite interim alimony, or interlocutory alimony and
s
is an allowance by the court for the maintenance of a spouse
during pendency of a matrimonial action. [Kansas law] allows
a court to award maintenance pendente lite .... an award of
temporary maintenance lies within the discretion of the Court.
The amount is subject to modification as the circumstances
change. In any event, the temporary maintenance ceases when
the divorce action terminates.? In Edwards v. Edwards, 182
Kan. 737, 324 P. 2d 150 (1958), the court said: san allowance
of support...pendente lite does not become a final judgment on
which execution can issue, but is merely a temporary or ad
interim provision for their support until the final
determination of the action
'
When addressing the issue of past due installments of
temporary support, however, the court in Edwards said: "The
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rule that past due installments for child support [or
permanent alimony] ordered paid by the final decree become
final judgments as of the dates due and may be collected in
the same manner as other judgments, is clearly inapplicable to
past due installments of support allowed pendente lite.'
Further the court said: 'An order allowing temporary alimony
is not in the nature of a final judgment on which execution
can issue, nor is it a decree in equity for the payment of
money. No vested rights are acquired in the amount allowed.
Like other interlocutory orders, an order for support money
pendente lite remain solely in the sound judicial discretion
of the court which made it and may be modified as varying
circumstances justify during the time the action is pending in
any form in the district court, even to the extent of
discharging accrued and unpaid installments.
The past due installments .... did not become final
judgments.... which could be collected by execution.... those
installments, when due, were subject to enforcement by
attachment.... or by contempt proceedings." Dube v. Dube, 809
P. 2d 1245r 1248 (Kan. App. 1991) See Edwards v. Edwards, 324
P.2d 150 (Kan. 1958) cited as a footnote in Eskelson v.
Eskelson, 528 P.2d 1186 (Utah 1974) (emphasis added)
The Court in Dube also pointed out:
11

"A temporary alimony award pending the final judgment in the
lower court is merged in the judgment and does not continue
after the judgment." Dube, 809 P.2d at 1248. quoting Rankin
v. Rankin, 275 So.2d 283, 284 (Fla. Dist. App. 1973).
The Dube case is persuasive and would indicate that the
temporary alimony ordered in the instant case should not be
considered as a final judgment, that it merged into the divorce
decree entered December 4, 1991, and that interest on the temporary
arrearages should not be awarded.

Awarding of such interest must

be kept discretionary with the Trial Court:
"Given the highly discretionary nature of property division
cases, we hold that a trial court may award pre-judgment interest
in divorce proceedings. It is not required, however, and interest
should not be awarded where it "would do an injustice. ' The trial
court should consider the facts of each particular case. A party
in a divorce proceeding is not "entitled' to such interest in every
case, because the trial court must have broad discretion to
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determine the most equitable distribution of marital property under
the particular circumstances."

Morris v. Morris, 724 P.2d 527,

530, (Alaska 1986).
Appellee respectfully urges this Court to not award interest
on the temporary alimony which was ordered to be paid to the
Appellant by the Appellee.

Appellant filed for a divorce in Utah

and served the Appellee in Nevada. Appellant obtained a temporary
order of $1500.00 per month alimony, but Appellee filed a written
objection to the request for temporary alimony.

Appellee did not

attend the hearing because he did not want to jeopardize his
employment, but no action was ever taken on his written objection
to the order.

During the trial Appellee testified that he paid

$25,337.00 to the Appellant, which included amounts paid to her
since the separation and garnishment. Tr. p. 176.

By the time of

trial, however, Appellant claimed delinquent temporary alimony
amounted to the sum of $27,507.00.
In its findings, the Trial Court found that Appellee owed
Appellant the full $27,507.00 in delinquent alimony and that the
Appellant should be awarded ongoing alimony. In its Conclusions of
Law, the Court stated that the Appellee should pay to the Appellant
the sum of $400.00 per month ongoing alimony, and the sum of
$600.00 per month in liquidation of the delinquent alimony sum of
$27,507.00, which the Court calculated would take 45.845 months,
and that the Appellee should not be required to pay interest on the
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delinquent alimony.

In any event, the past due alimony has been

merged into and included in the final divorce decree.

It is

reasonable to conclude that based on its findings, the Trial Court
concluded

that

requiring

interest

on

the

temporary

alimony

arrearage would be unfair and inequitable as to the Appellee.
The Trial Court denied

interest based on the following

grounds:
The motion of the Plaintiff that she be awarded interest
on the Plaintiff's Judgment for delinquent alimony that has
been awarded Plaintiff by the Court should be and hereby is
denied, it appearing that any delay in the performance of the
terms of the Decree of Divorce with rsespect to payment of
past due alimony to the Plaintiff, by the Defendant, will be
caused, if at all, solely by the Appeal of this case by the
Plaintiff.
See Order, executed by Ronald 0. Hyde, District Judge on
February 25, 1992.
Appellee urges this court that awarding interest on the
temporary alimony arrearages will not only increase the burden of
Appellee in paying the arrearages and the ongoing alimony, but will
also affect future divorce cases where interest on temporary
alimony payments may be considered.

In its effort to find equity

to the parties, the Trial Court is given discretion as to whether
interest should be assessed. Divorce is extremely difficult, both
financially, and emotionally, on both parties in the divorce case.
CONCLUSION
A Trial Court's decision will not be disturbed unless the
facts, viewed in a light most favorable to the Trial Court's
-48-
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decision, demonstrate a clear abuse of discretion.

Utah case law

and the specific facts of this case would support a total denial of
alimony to Appellant, and certainly support the alimony awarded by
the Trial Court.
The Trial Court has the discretion to determine the standard
of living at the time of separation, if the facts of the case
demonstrate that is fair and equitable. Several of the reasons the
Trial Court was justified in the award of alimony:

Appellant's

unsustantiated monthly living expenses, the agreement between the
parties,

Appellant's

obvious

credibility

problem,

and

the

Appellant's abandonment of Appellee.
The Quit-Claim Deed was executed by the Appellee to protect
the marital residence from the parties' business creditors and not
to buy the Appellant's worthless interest in the partnership.
Regardless, the Court is not bound by the state of title in the
distribution of marital assets. The Appellee did not disclaim his
interest in the marital residence in the corporate bankruptcy,
therefore, Judical or Quasi Estoppel is not applicable here.
On the issue of attorney's fees, the Trial Court discussed at
length

its

findings

regarding

Appellant's

financial

need.

Appellant has not marshalled the evidence in support of the
findings to show how that evidence viewed in the light most
favorable to the Trial Court is nevertheless insufficient to
support the findings and conclusions of law rendered by the Trial
-49-
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Court.

In addition evidence regarding Appellant's financial need

was adequately set forth in the trial record, including an inflated
Affidavit of Monthly Expenses labeled by the Trial Court as more a
"wish list than a needs list."
The Trial Court did not err in denying interest on temporary
alimony payments awarded to the Appellant before trial.

The

"judgment" entitled "Recommended Order on Order To Show Cause and
Order" is not a final judgment, but is an interloclutory order.
Appellant did not comply with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure or
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

In the alternative, said

"Order" is defective. Further, Section 30-3-10.6 is not applicable
to alimony but only child and spousal support payments under a
child support order.
Based upon the aforementioned reasons, Appellee respectfully
prays this court to deny Appellant's appeal and affirm the Trial
Court's decision.
Respectfully sumitted this 19th d^y of

z.

pctop4p,

DONI^EC CASSITY
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that two (2) true and correct copies of the
foregoing Brief of Appellee was mailed, postage prepaid, to
Plaintiff/Appellant Joy A. Hoagland, by and through her attorneys
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JOY A. HOAGLAND,
RECOMMENDED ORDER ON
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
AND ORDER

Plaintiff,

MAY 2 8 1991

vs.
COLIN G. HOAGLAND,

Civil No. 890903214

Defendant.

JUDGE RONALD 0. HYDE

The above captioned matter came on regularly for hearing
on

the

30th

day

of

April,

1991,

before

the

Honorable

Maurice

Richards, Domestic Relations Commissioner, upon Plaintiff's Order
To Show Cause In Re Contempt and Entry of Judgment.

Plaintiff was

present and represented by counsel, Michelle E. Heward on behalf of
David Bert Havas and Associates, and Defendant was not present nor
was he represented by counsel.

The Commissioner having been fully

apprised in the circumstances, now makes the following findings:
1.

Plaintiff and Defendant were married on September 6,

1973, and have lived separate and apart since December 28, 1986.
2.

Defendant in an Order to Show Cause hearing held on

September 19, 1989, was ordered to pay Plaintiff temporary alimony
in the amount of Fifteen Hundred Dollars ($1,500.00) per month.
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In addition, Defendant was ordered to pay Plain-

attorney's

fees

in

the

amount

of

Two

Hundred

Dollars

($200.00).
4.

Defendant has paid a total of Eight Thousand Fifty

Dollars ($8,050.00) alimony from September 1989, to March 1991.
5.

Defendant is in arrears of alimony in the amount of

Twenty One Thousand One Hundred Fifty Dollars ($21,150.00) for the
period September 1989 through April, 1991, and attorney's fees in
the amount of Two Hundred Dollars ($200.00).
6.

Defendant

had

the

ability

to

pay

the

alimony

payments as ordered since he earned in excess of $6,600.00 gross
per month during the year 1990.
7.

Defendant is in contempt of Court for his failure to

pay the alimony and attorney's fees as ordered.
8.

Plaintiff has incurred reasonable attorney's fees

and costs to pursue this matter.
From the foregoing findings the Commissioner makes the
following RECOMMENDATIONS:
1.

Plaintiff be awarded a judgment in the amount of

Twenty One Thousand One Hundred Fifty Dollars ($21,150.00) against
Defendant for arrearages in alimony for the period September 1989,
through April 1991, plus interest at the statutory rate of twelve
percent (12*) per annum.
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Defendant be ordered to pay Plaintiff's attorney's

fees for this Order to Show Cause in the amount of Five Hundred
Dollars ($500.00) plus costs of Eighty Five Dollars ($85.00)
3.

Plaintiff be awarded a judgment in the amount of Two

Hundred Dollars ($200.00) for attorney's fees previously ordered to
be paid by Defendant.
4.

The total judgment amount to be awarded is Twenty

One Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-Five Dollars ($21,935.00).
5.

It is recommended that Defendant be held in contempt

of the Court's order for failure to pay alimony in a timely manner.
That Defendant be ordered to serve five (5) days jail sentence
unless Defendant purges himself by paying the above judgment within
ten days from the entry of the Order herein.
6.

That this order become final ten (10) days from the

date of mailing.
DATED t his

^ 6

day of May, 1991

RECOMMENDED AND APPROVED BY:

HOAGLAND V. HOAGLAND
Recommendations and Order On
Order To Show Cause and Order

Civil No. 890903214
^fY^Hr^i
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DEFENDANT

,
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DEFENDANT:

YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that you have ten (10) days
from the date of May 9, 1991, to file a written objection to the
above recommendations with the Domestic Relations Clerk, Second
District Court of Weber County, 6th Floor, Ogden, Utah

84401,

pursuant

to Section 30-3-4.4(3), Utah Code Annotated,

1953 as

amended.

Failure to do so will result in the following Order being

signed by a District Court Judge and the recommendations shall then
become order of the Court.
DATED this

Govern yourself accordingly.
day of May, 1991.

lEtfARD, No.
No. 5084
5084 of
o
MICHELLE E. HEWARD,
DAVID BERT HAVAS AND ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiff
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Recommended Order on Order To Show Cause to Donn E.
Cassity of Romney, Nelson & Cassity, 115 Social Hall Avenue, Salt
Lake City, Utah
1991.

84111; postage prepaid this {(/r^ day of May,

commendations and Order On
r 7c Zho^ Cause and Order
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• 'Lee having been given to the above named Defendant,
ten

d-

ue.te,'

tion:

5"- "'ing expired

since

the date of hearing herein and

- i"^ ing failed to file any objections to the recommendaeir
1" IS HEREBY ORDERED that said recommendations be and are

hereby -pproved and ordered.
L..IED this *13

day of May, 1991.
BY THE COURT:
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JOY A. HOAGLAND,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

vs.
\

COLIN G. HOAGLAND,

Case No.
\

Defendant.

890903214
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Both parties agree this relationship has irreconcilable
differences.
the

other

Each of the parties is granted a divorce against
on

the

grounds

that

differences between the parties.

there

are

irreconcilable

The divorce shall become final

upon signing and entry.
The problem here is the division of property and question
of alimony.
defendant

Plaintiff claims the home was given to her by the
in

exchange

for

any

interest

in

the

business.

Defendant claim is that the title to the property was placed in
the plaintiff's name in order to protect it because the business
was failing.

He testified that the banks wanted the home placed

for additional security and he would not do this.

I hold that

the property was placed in the plaintiff's name to protect it
from business failure and that the home is a marital asset.

The

Memorandum Decision
Case No. 890903214
Page 2
business did fail and the parties divided up some cash that was
approximately

$10,000.00

as

defendant's

portion

and

neither

plaintiff or defendant made the claim that this belonged to the
defendant as the remains of the business.

It was in fact left

with the plaintiff when defendant went looking for work.

The

evidence does show that the initial payment on the family home
came

from

the plaintiff's home that she had prior to this

marriage.

Plaintiff's claim for $19,672.00 which was the down

payment on the new home is awarded to the plaintiff.

He has

purchased an additional home, furniture, and vehicles since the
separation.
equity

as

household

The evidence indicates that none of these has any
the

amounts

are

equal

to

the

value.

The

furniture and fixtures in the family home in Ogden

have not been valued.
property

owed

The furniture, fixture, and personal

in plaintiff's possession

is awarded

to her.

The

furniture, vehicles, and property in defendant's possession is
awarded to him, the home is to be divided as a martial asset.
The parties were married

fourteen years prior to the

failure of the business and the defendant leaving and looking
for employment.
marriage.

At the present time it is a eighteen year

This is not an instance were plaintiff stayed home

and raised the children while the defendant progressed through
the

business world

to arrive at a favorable position.

The

Memorandum Decision
Case No. 890903214
Page 3
plaintiff

had

four

children

prior

to

her

marriage

to

the

defendant and the defendant accepted them as family and assisted
in their growth and well being.

Defendant's position in the

business world was arrived at after his separation
plaintiff.

The

evidence

children as his family.

shows

that he

still

from the

looks

at her

It also supports his version that he

wanted her to join him in Las Vegas but she refused.

She claims

they did not discuss her moving, however she does" acknowledge
that they did discuss renting out the home here in Ogden.
This

is

also

not

a

case

were

plaintiff

accustomed to a high standard of living.

has

become

Prior to defendant's

business failing the evidence is that he was grossing $500.00
per week.

This is a gross of $26,000.00 a year which was used

for the family needs. His tax returns indicate actual income
considerably

less.

Plaintiff

is now

employed

part

time at

Internal Revenue Service as a GS-5 Step 1 with a gross yearly
salary of $16,973.

Being part time her gross pay was $8,280.00

in addition thereto she drew unemployment for ten weeks which
would give her a gross $9,780.

Her testimony was that when she

goes back to work this year it will be at an increased amount.
Employment

history

indicates

since

she

graduated

from

high

school in 1953 she has basically worked in clerking positions or
assembly line positions she has never earned high income.

Her

Memorandum Decision
Case No, 890903214
Page 4
health is good and she is suffering no disabilities.

Evidence

shows that by leaving the area the defendant was able to go to
work for Smith's and at one time was a store manager.

By reason

of his contracting rheumatoid arthritis he has had to downgrade
his job to that of a buyer.

Evidence indicates his income will

be

$56,000.

When

plaintiff.

He

approximately

totally

abandon

$10,000.00

defendant
left

left

between

he

did

not

$8,000.00

and

cash which she could use for house payments and-

payment of bills and in addition thereto she has sold off some
property like the recreational vehicle for some $9,000.00 plus
he did send her some funds.
order

of

$1,500.00

per

Plaintiff did obtain a temporary

month

alimony.

Defendant

filed

an

objection to the request for temporary alimony but he was not
present at the hearing and no action was ever taken on his
objection to the order.
Plaintiff filed an affidavit of monthly expenses showing
present monthly expense of $1,796.00 per month, her request for
alimony would cover this with the exception of approximately
$300.

The problem with her affidavit

indication of her expenses.
list.

Example

would

be

is it is not a true

It is more a wish list than a needs
the

transportation

figure

of

some

$531.00 a month and her testimony is she drives very little.
Her personal expenses of $270.00 per month includes recreational

Memorandum Decision
Case No. 890903214
Page 5
and travel of over $130.00 and she testified she does not travel
and spends very little on recreation.
$350.00

a

month

simply

is

not

Her food expenses total

realistic.

It

appears

the

affidavit is made more with the view to obtain high alimony than
to advising the court of her actual expenses.
I hold that the home is a marital asset and is to be
subject to division between the parties.
sold.

The home is to be

The plaintiff is to be awarded the first $19,672.00 which

would be for her equity of her home prior to the marriage.
After the expense of sale is deducted, the remaining equity is
to be divided between the parties.
The request

for all of the home plus alimony

is not

realistic or fair.
The plaintiff did obtain an order for temporary support
of $1,500.00 a month, plaintiff has been unable to make these
payments and is delinquent in the sum of $27,507.

I order that

the defendant is to pay to the plaintiff the sum of $1,000 per
month.

This $1,000.00 shall be a payment of $600.00 per month

on the back alimony that was awarded and $400.00 per month on
going.

Plaintiff shall have the use and occupancy of the home

until it is sold and the the defendant's lien thereon shall not
draw

interest.

The

payment

of

the

$27,507.00

accumulated

alimony at $600.00 a month will take 45 months to clear up and

Memorandum Decision
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this figure also shall not draw interest.

The payment of the

back award will take 3.8 years and by that time plaintiff should
be

employed

continuing

on

a

alimony

full

time

shall

basis.

continue

as

The

$400.00

per

an

assistance

month

fro

her

subsequent housing.
Neither party has much retirement accumulated, however
each shall have interest in the others per the Woodward formula.
Plaintiff

testified

she did not know if health and

insurance was available to her through her employment•

accident
If it is

she should obtain that, if it is not, then the defendant is to
assist

in

obtaining

whatever

benefit

he

can

year

plus

through

his

employment at her expense.
His

payment

of

$12,000.00

a

her

current

earnings even on a part time basis of $9,780.00 a year give her a
gross income of almost $22,000.00 per year.

This equates almost

to a figure equal to what the family was living on when defendant
was

drawing

$500.00

a week

from

the business prior

to

the

separation and is a monthly amount greater than the amounts set
out

in

the

plaintiff.

affidavit

of

monthly

expenses

as

filed

by

the

Therefore each party is to pay their own attorney's

fees and costs.
Defendant's counsel to prepare findings, conclusion, and
judgment in accordance herewith.
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DATED th*-s

«

da

Y

of

November, 1991,

DONALD O. HYDE, Judg
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
j hereby certify that on the

'

day of November,

19SI. I. sent a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum
Decision to counsel as follows:
David B. Havas
2604 Madison Avenue
Ogden, Utah 84401
Don E. Cassity
115 Social Hall Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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D^piuty

Court Clerk
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ROMNEY, NELSON & CASSITY
Attorneys for Defendant
115 Social Hall Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 328-3261
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JOY A. HOAGLAND,
DECREE OF DIVORCE
Plaintiff,
« $

vs.
CASE NO. 890903214
RONALD O. HYDE, JUDGE

COLIN G. HOAGLAND,
Defendant,

The above-entitled matter having come on for Trial on the 28th
day of November, 1991, before the Honorable Ronald O. Hyde, Judge,
sitting without a jury, and the Court having heard the evidence
presented in behalf of and by the Plaintiff, and in behalf of and
by the Defendant, and the Court having heretofore entered its
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and good cause appearing
therefore, it is now,
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
1.

That the Plaintiff and the Defe idant should be and hereby

are divorced from each other, said Decree of Divorce to become
final upon execution by the Court and upon entry of the Decree of
Divorce.
2.

That the real estate and improvements thereon accumulated

by the parties, Plaintiff

and Defendant, during the marriage,

ft
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commonly described as 151 West 5400 South, Washington Terrace,
Weber County, State of Utah, and more particularly described as
Lot 163, South Ridge Subdivision No.
7 located in Weber County, State of
Utah as Recorded in the Weber County
Recorder's Office
should be and hereby is determined to be a marital asset.
3.

It is hereby ordered

that the said real

estate and

improvements is to be forthwith listed for sale, and is to be sold,
and the Plaintiff and Defendant are ordered to execute any and all
documents both with respect to the offering of the property for
sale, and the closing and deeding of the property to the buyer, as
will become necessary on a timely and appropriate basis, consistent
with the need of sales persons, title company personnel, and the
terms of the Sales Agreement between the Seller and the Buyer.

The

Plaintiff and Defendait are both orderec: to be cooperative in all
respects with regard to the offering of sale, and the closing of
the sale of the said real estate and improvements.
4.

The Plaintiff should be and hereby is awarded from the net

sale proceeds of the said real estate the first $19,672.00, and it
is ordered that the balance of the proceeds from the sale of the
real estate is to be paid one-half to the Plaintiff and one-half to
the Defendant.
5.

Judgment

for unpaid temporary alimony in the sum of

$27,507.00 is hereby awarded to the Plaintiff, and against the
Defendant, said sum to be paid to the Defendant at the rate of
$600.00 per month, until the full sum of $27,507.00 has been paid
to the Plaintiff.
2
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I
•

That ongoing alimony should be and hereby is ordered to be

paid by the Defendant to the Plaintiff in the sum of $400.00 per
month.
7.

That Plaintiff shall be permitted to use and occupy the

residence of the parties until it is sold. Plaintiff is ordered to
cooperate in all reasonable manner with the sales persons engaged
in obtaining a qualified buyer for the said real estate.
8.

The Defendant shall have a lien for his portion of the

equity in the real estate described in paragraph 3 above, which
lien shall not draw interest, nor shall :.nterest be incurred as to
the Plaintiff's $19,672.00 sum to be paid out of the sale proceeds,
nor shall interest be paid or accumulate on the past due alimony
awarded to the Plaintiff, in the sum of $27,507.00.
9.
Woodward,

That it is hereby ordered tha*': based upon Woodward vs.
and

the

formula

setforth

therein

for

division

of

retirement income, th^t each of the parties shall have claim in the
other parties retirement income to the extent it was earned by
Plaintiff and Defendent as of October 2£. 1991.
10.

It is ordered that the Plaintiff shall, if health and

accident insurance is available to her through her employment, to
obtain said insurance, and it is further ordered that in the event
that it is not available to the Plaintiff at her employment, that
the Defendant is to assist the Plaintiff in obtaining whatever
insurance benefit, if any, he can for the Plaintiff through his own
employment, at the expense of the Plaintiff.
11.
That the Plaintiff and the Defendant should, and it is
3
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hereby Ordered that each party shall pay their own attorneys fees
and costs incurred herein.
DATED this

y

day of

^)JJJ* _

, 1991.

BY THECOURT:

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
On this 31

day of November, 1991.. I certify that I mailed,

postage prepaid, a cp^py of the foregoinc Decree of Divorce to the
Plaintiff by mailing a copy thereof to her attorney, David Burt
Havas, at his off ice ..at 2604 Madison Avenue, Ogden, Utah 84401.

^ \'<.
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CCtWV Of WEBER

\
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JOY A. HOAGLAND,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,

DEC 0 A 199'

vs.
CASE NO. 890903214
JUDGE: RONALD 0. HYDE

COLIN G. HOAGLAND,
Defendant.

The

above-entitled matter came on for Trial

before the

Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde, Second Judicial District Court Judge for
Weber County, sitting without a Jury, at 9:30 a.m. on the 28th day
of October, 1991, and the Plaintiff, Joy A. Hoagland, and her
attorney, David Burt Havas, were present, and the Defendant, Colin
G. Hoagland, and his attorney, Donn E. C&ssity, were present, and
the

Plaintiff

evidence,

and

having

presented

the Defendant

her

having

testimony,
presented

exhibits
his

and

testimony,

exhibits and testimony, and the attorneys having made their closing
arguments, and the Court now being fully informed in the premises,
now makes its

FINDINGS OF FAC^
1.

That the Plaintiff, Joy A. Holland, resided in Weber
1

County, State of Utah in excess of 90 days prior to the filing of
the Complaint in the above-entitled matter by the Plaintiff.
2.

That the Plaintiff and Defendant were married in Elko,

Nevada on the 5th day of September, 1973•>
3.

That no children were born as issue of the marriage, but

at the time of the marriage of the Plaintiff and the Defendant four
children, siblings of the Plaintiff from another marriage lived in
the home

and were raised substantially by the Plaintiff and

Defendant, with the Defendant, Step-Father, providing a substantial
part of the support economically for the children, and which
Defendant developed a very close and loving relationship with each
of Plaintiff's children, which relationship has continued to the
present.
4.

That durinc the year of 190 i marital problems arose

between the parties, rand they were separated twice for a few weeks
but were reunited near the end of 1986, ct which time the Defendant
who was unemployed, and, whose grocery business had been closed,
and gone through Bankruptcy, left the residence of the parties in
Ogden Utah to seek employment, which he found in Las Vegas, Nevada.
5.

That when the Plaintiff married the Defendant he was an

employee of Smiths, a grocery company business, but later Defendant
quit his employment at Smiths and opened his own grocery store,
which business was operated until August of 1986, at which time the
Defendant

and his brother closed the business and filed the

Business Corporation in Bankruptcy.
6.

That prior to the closing of the business the Defendant
2

conveyed title to the residence and lot of the parties to the
Plaintiff as a security against the possibility that Creditors
might claim against the real and/or personal property of the
Plaintiff and Defendant.

No such claim was ever made by any

Creditor, however.
7. That during 1986 the parties developed serious problems in
their marriage relationship.
8.

That the Defendant in January of 1987 found gainful

employment in Las Vegas, Nevada, again working for Smiths in the
grocery business.

After being settled in Las Vegas in his new

employment. Defendant purchased a newly constructed residence and
lot and, invited the Plaintiff to come to Las Vegas.

At the time

of the visit the Defendant showed the Plaintiff the house, but when
the Defendant asked her to move to Nevada so they could live
together in the new home, she refused, stating, "My home is in
Ogden, Utah".

The Defendant told the Plaintiff that they could

lease the home in Ogden and thus retain it, and that a good
business friend in Ogden would manage it and make certain that it
was protected in their absence.

The Plaintiff refused to move to

Nevada, and effectively the parties were then separated and have
never since that period lived together. The marital parties have,
and have had irreconcilable differences since at least April of
1987.
9.

That at the time Defendant left the parties home in his

pursuit of employment in Nevada the Defendant took with him some
$300.00 plus dollars, together with a pick-up truck that was
3

encumbered and a motorcycle.

He left in the possession of the

Plaintiff approximately $8,000.00 to $10,000.00 in cash, a motor
home of the parties, which the Defendant believed had a value of
$12,000.00 to $15,000.00, but which at a later time the Plaintiff
sold for $9,000.00 cash.

The Defendant also left with the

Plaintiff all of the furniture, the house, lot, swimming pool, and
a 1980 Lincoln Town Car, and a 1976 Chevrolet.

None of the

vehicles were encumbered at that time. That none of the $8,000.00
- $10,000.00 cash, or the $9,000.00 received by the Plaintiff from
sale of the motor home was shared by Plaintiff with the Defendant.
10.

That after it became obvious by April of 1987 that the

Plaintiff was flatly refusing to rejoin the Defendant, as his wife,
the Plaintiff and Defendant agreed upon a

divorce, and the

Defendant proposed that the Plaintiff regain as her sole property
all of the vehicles, money, house and ILci , furniture and household
furnishings, and other personal property that he had left with
Plaintiff at the time Defendant went to Nevada, and that the
Plaintiff forego any claim to alimony from the Defendant.

The

Defendant believed, until the Complaint for Divorce was filed by
Plaintiff that Plaintiff had agreed to accept the marital assets as
her own, in lieu of any claim for alimony from the Defendant.
By the time the Complaint in the above matter was filed by the
Plaintiff the Defendant had been transferred by his employer from
Las Vegas to Reno, Nevada.
11.

A Hearing on an Order to Show Cause was held in the

absence of the Defendant, he being in Nevada at his work, and an
4

Order for temporary alimony was ordered by the Court in the sum of
$1,500.00 per month.
temporary

unpaid

That at the time of Trial of the case,

alimony

had

accrued

in

the

total

sum

of

$27,507.00.
12. That at the time of the marriage of the Plaintiff and the
Defendant the Plaintiff had an equity in a house and lot and the
Plaintiff and Defendant lived in the said house for a period of
time.

The Plaintiff house was sold.

During the time that the

Plaintiff and the Defendant lived in the Plaintiff's home the
Defendant made the mortgage payments.

Defendant also essentially

paid all of the mortgage payments on the home that the parties own
at the present time, and which was purchased by the parties
subsequent to the sale of the Plaintiff's home.
13.

That since the separation of the parties the Plaintiff

temporarily had a daughter and a child live with her, but otherwise
Plaintiff has lived ii the home, alone, since the separation of the
parties. The home is a four bedroom, two level home, with swimming
pool, patio and covered porch, two car garage within the house, and
no mortgage is owing on the said real estate.

The house and lot

have been appraised twice, for $97,000 and for $85,000.00
14.

That neither the Plaintiff nor Defendant

has much

retirement benefits accumulated, if any15.

That since the filing of the divorce the Defendant has

been transferred from Reno, Nevada by his employer to Phoenix,
Arizona, and Defendant has purchased a house and lot in Glendale,
Arizona,

and

a pick-up truck and a boat
5

in which

there is

essentially no equity.
16.

That the Plaintiff has had the sole use of the parties

real estate, furniture, fixtures and all of the other personal
property accumulated by the parties during the marriage since the
separation of the parties in December of 1986.
17.

That the Plaintiff had not become accustomed to a high

standard of living during the marriage, it appearing from the
evidence that prior to Defendant's business failing in 1986 he was
grossing approximately $500.00 per week which was used for family
needs.

The parties income tax returns for years prior thereto

indicate actual income considerably less.
18.

Plaintiff is employed currently as she has been for some

time with the United.States Treasury Department, Internal Revenue
Services

as a GS-5

$16,973.00,

and

a

Step One with a gross yearly
part-time

gross

pay

of

salary of

$8,280.00,

plus

unemployment for ten -veeks giving her a jross income of $9,780.00
per year.
19.

Plaintiff testified that she would receive an increased

income when she returns to work in 1992.
20.

That the Plaintiff's employment history indicates that

she graduated from High School in 1953 and has basically worked in
clerking positions or assembly line positions, and has never earned
a high income.
21.

Plaintiff's

health

is

good

and

she

suffers

no

disabilities.
22. Defendant after reobtaining employment with Smiths became
6

a Store Manager, but he developed Rheumatoid Arthritis and has had
to down grade his job to that of a buyer, and his income will be
approximately $56,000.00 per annum.
23.

That Plaintiff filed an Affidavit of monthly expenses

showing present monthly expenses of $1,796.00 per month, however,
Plaintiff's Affidavit is more a wish list than a needs list.
An example of that fact is that the transportation figure that
the Plaintiff uses in her monthly expenses list shows $531.00 for
transportation expense though her testimony is that she drives very
little.

She also indicates that her personal expenses of $270.00

per month includes recreational and travel of over $130.00, and she
testified that she does not travel and spends very little money on
recreation.

In addition, she recites that her food expenses

totalled $350.00 per month which is not a realistic sum to spend
for one person, and reflects a desire on. the part of the Plaintiff
to obtain high alimony rather than reasonably advising the Court of
the Plaintiff's actual expenses.
24.

That the Plaintiff claims that the house and lot in

Washington Terrace was deeded to her in exchange for any claim she
had against ownership of the grocery store business that was
operated by the Defendant and his brother.
25.

The Court finds, however, that the Deed was conveyed at

a time when the grocery business of the Defendant and his brother
was closing down and near Bankruptcy and ultimately went into
Bankruptcy, and that there was little, or no value in the business
at the time of the conveyance by Defendant of title by Quit Claim
7

Deed to the Plaintiff.
26.

The evidence shows that the Defendant still, at this

date, looks at the Plaintiff's children as his family, which fact
supports Defendants version that he wanted Plaintiff to join him in
Las Vegas to continue the marriage, but that Plaintiff refused to
do so.
27.

The Plaintiff claims that no such discussion of her

moving to Nevada took place, but Plaintiff does acknowledge that
Plaintiff and Defendant did discuss renting out the residence and
lot in Washington Terrace, Ogden, Utah.
The Court having entered its Findings of Feet now enters its

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

That the Court has jurisdiction in the above-entitled

matter.
2.

That the parties have irreconcilable differences one with

the other, and they should be divorced from each other, and the
divorce should be final upon execution and entry by the Court.
3. That the residence and lot located at 151 West 5400 South,
Washington Terrace, Weber County, State of Utah, is a marital
asset.
4.
5.
awarded,

That the said real estate should be sold.
That from the sale proceeds, the Plaintiff should be
the first $19,672.00, without interest, representing

Plaintiff's equity from her home prior to the marriage of the
parties.
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6.
of

the

That after the expenses of sale are deducted the balance
remaining

equity

should

be divided,

one-half

to the

Plaintiff, and one-half to the Defendant,
7. That the Court determines that there is delinquent alimony
owed to the Plaintiff in the sum of $27,507.00.
8.

That the Plaintiff should be awarded on going alimony.

9.

That the Defendant should pay to the Plaintiff the sum of

$600.00 per month in liquidation of the delinquent alimony

sum of

$27,507.00, which the Court calculates will take 45.845 months, and
the Defendant

should not be required to pay interest on the

delinquent alimony.
10.

The payment of the back alimony will take Defendant 3.82

years, and by that time the Plaintiff should be employed on a full
time basis.
11.

That the Plaintiff should have the use and occupancy of

the parties house and lot until it is sold, and the Defendant's
lien on the equity in the real estate should not draw interest.
12.
accumulated,

That

neither

party

has

much

retirement

but each should have an interest

benefits

in the others

retirement per the Woodward v. Woodward formula.
13. If the Plaintiff can obtain health and accident insurance
through her employment she should obtain that, but if the said
insurance is not available to the Plaintiff then the Defendant
should assist the Plaintiff in obtaining whatever medical benefit,
if any, she can through Defendants employment, at the Plaintiff's
expense.
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14.

The Plaintiff in receiving $12,000.00 a year for 3.8

years from the Defendant, plus her current earnings on a part time
basis of $9,780.00

or more, will provide Plaintiff with a gross

income of almost $22,000.00 per year, which is almost equal to the
income which the parties were living on when the Defendant was
drawing $500.00 per week from his business prior to the separation
of the parties, and represents a monthly amount greater than the
amounts set out in the Affidavit of monthly expenses as filed by
the Plaintiff.

Therefore, the Plaintiff and the Defendant should

each pay their own attorneys fees and costs.
DATED this

*/

*^>JUL^

day of

, 1991.

BY THE COURT:

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
On this _ ^ 3 — d a y

of

^^^n^^^^6^

1991, I certify that

I mailed, postage prepaid, to the Plaintiff's attorney, David Burt
Havas, at his office at 2604 Madison Avenue, Ogden, Utah 84401, a
copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in
the above-entitled case.

J*^tf vi i : L ^ .
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DONN E. CASSITY (#594)
ROMNEY, NELSON & CASSITY
Attorneys for Defendant
115 Social Hall Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 328-3261

I

A,,r>-

" '' " "'^ITY
.~r. ceo 95 ffi\ 11 08
'^L • LJ ~

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JOY A. HOAGLAND,

)
)
)

Plaintiff,

ORDER

<a
\V>

)

vs.

)
)
)

COLIN G. HOAGLAND,

CASE NO. 890903214
RONALD O. HYDE, JUDGE

)

Defendant.

On the 9th day of January, 1992, at the hour of 10:00 a.m. the
Motion of the Plaintiff to Amend Findings of Fact in the aboveentitled matter came on for Hearing, and the Plaintiff was present
and represented by her counsel, David Burt Havas, and the Defendant
was

not present

but was represented by his counsel, Donn E.

Cassity, and after argument in behalf of Plaintiff's Motion by
Plaintiff's counsel, and the objection and argument of counsel for
the Defendant, Donn E. Cassity, the Court now being fully advised
in the premises does now
ORDER that the Findings of Fact heretofore executed by the
Court on the 4th day of December, 1991, be amended as to Paragraph
9 of the Findings of Fact wherein on page 4, third line down, the
words "which the Defendant believed had a value of $12,000.00 to
$15,000.00, but" be deleted and the balance of said sentence in
1

^

J Page

•!«/•<<*•<, 1

Indexed

]

said Paragraph 9 be left as written, and it is further Ordered the
Paragraph 10 of the Findings of Fact be amended by deleting the
first three lines of Paragraph 10 including the first word of the
fourth line of Paragraph 10, and insert in place of those words as
follows "That the parties had conversation regarding distribution
of the marital assets, and the Defendant", and starting with the
word "proposed" in the fourth line of the Findings of Fact the
balance of the Paragraph 10 is to remain as previously written.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the last sentence of Paragraph 12
on Page 5 of the Findings of Fact shall be amended by deleting the
said sentence beginning with the word "Defendant" and ending with
the word "home".
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that no further amendments proposed by
the Plaintiff are approved, and are hereby denied.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that in the event sale of the marital
real estate and division of the net proceeds thereof are upheld by
the Utah Court of Appeals, that in view of the fact that the real
estate of the parties commonly known as 151 West 5400 South
Washington Terrace, Weber County, State of Utah, is by decree of
divorce ordered to be sold, and since the Defendant's equity in the
said marital real estate will not, because of Plaintiff's appeal,
be timely paid to Defendant, due to Plaintiff's appeal of the
Court's decision, that interest on the net equity of the Defendant
in the said real estate, when it is sold, shall bear interest from
date of Plaintiffs Notice of Appeal at the rate of ten (10%)
percent per annum, which interest shall be paid to the Defendant in

2

Indexed

I

addition to the principal amount of the net sales price awarded to
Defendant, following sale of the marital real estate, so long as
the Defendant pays the Plaintiff alimony consistant with the
provisions of the Decree of Divorce, executed and entered by the
Court on December 4, 1991.
The motion of the Plaintiff that she be awarded interest on
the Plaintiff's Judgment for delinquent alimony that has been
awarded Plaintiff by the Court should be and hereby is denied, it
appearing that any delay in the performance of the terms of the
Decree of Divorce with respect to payment of past due alimony to
the Plaintiff, by the Defendant, will be caused, if at ail, solely
by the Appeal of this case by the Plaintiff.
The Order of the Court as to payment of interest to the
Defendant,

is not intended by the Court to limit any right

Defendant otherwise .has withrrespect to the marital estate.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that on the /b

' day of January, 1992, I mailed,

postage prepaid, a copy of the foregoing Order in the aboveentitled case to the Plaintiff by mailing a copy thereof to her

3

counsel, David Burt Havas, at his office at 2604 Madison Avenue,
Ogden, Utah 84401.
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JOY A. HOAGLAND,

AMENDED FINDINGS
OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
vs.

CASE NO. 890903214
JUDGE: RONALD O. HYDE

COLIN G. HOAGLAND,
Defendant.

The

above-entitled matter came on for Trial before the

Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde, .Second Judicial District Court Judge for
Weber County, sitting without a Jury, at 9:30 a.m. on the 28th day
of October, 1991, and the Plaintiff, Joy A. Hoagland, and her
attorney, David Burt lavas, were present, and the Defendant, Colin
G. Hoagland, and his attorney, Donn E. O.ssity, were present, and
the

Plaintiff

evidence,

and

havirj
the

presented

Defendant

her

having

testimony,
presented

exhibits
his

and

testimony,

exhibits and testimony, and the attorneys having made their closing
arguments, and the Court now being fully informed in the premises,
now makes its

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

That the Plaintiff, Joy A. Hoagland, resided in Weber
1

County, State of Utah in excess of 90 days prior to the filing of
the Complaint in the above-entitled matter by the Plaintiff,
2.

That the Plaintiff and Defendant were married in Elko,

Nevada on the 5th day of September, 1973.
3.

That no children were born as issue of the marriage, but

at the time of the marriage of the Plaintiff and the Defendant four
children, siblings of the Plaintiff from another marriage lived in
the home

and were raised substantially by the Plaintiff and

Defendant, with the Defendant, Step-Father, providing a substantial
part of the support economically for the children, and which
Defendant developed a very close and loving relationship with each
of Plaintiff's children, which relationship has continued to the
present.
4.

That during the year of 1986 marital problems arose

between the parties, .and they were separated twice for a few weeks
but were reunited near the end of 1986, at which time the Defendant
who was unemployed, and, whose grocery business had been closed,
and gone through Bankruptcy, left the residence of the parties in
Ogden Utah to seek employment, which he found in Las Vegas, Nevada.
5.

That when the Plaintiff married the Defendant he was an

employee of Smiths, a grocery company business, but later Defendant
quit his employment at Smiths and opened his own grocery store,
which business was operated until August of 1986, at which time the
Defendant

and his brother closed the business

and filed the

Business Corporation in Bankruptcy.
6.

That prior to the closing of the business the Defendant
2

conveyed title to the residence and lot of the parties to the
Plaintiff as a security against the possibility that Creditors
might claim against the real and/or personal property of the
Plaintiff and Defendant*

No such claim was ever made by any

Creditor, however.
7. That during 1986 the parties developed serious problems in
their marriage relationship.
8.

That the Defendant in January of 1987 found gainful

employment in Las Vegas, Nevada, again working for Smiths in the
grocery business.

After being settled in Las Vegas in his new

employment, Defendant purchased a newly constructed residence and
lot and, invited the Plaintiff to come to Las Vegas.

At the time

of the visit the Defendant showed the Plaintiff the house, but when
the Defendant asked her to move to Nevada so they could live
together in the new home, she refused, stating, MMy home is in
Ogden, Utah".

The Defendant told the Plaintiff that they could

lease the home in Ogden and thus retain it, and that a good
business friend in Ogden would manage it and make certain that it
was protected in their absence.

The Plaintiff refused to move to

Nevada, and effectively the parties were then separated and have
never since that period lived together. The marital parties have,
and have had irreconcilable differences since at least April of
1987.
9.

That at the time Defendant left the parties home in his

pursuit of employment in Nevada the Defendant took with him some
$300.00 plus dollars, together with a pick-up truck that was

3

encumbered and a motorcycle.

He left in the possession of the

Plaintiff approximately $8,000.00 to $10,000.00 in cash, a motor
home of the parties, which at a later time the Plaintiff sold for
$9,000.00 cash.

The Defendant also left with the Plaintiff all of

the furniture, the house, lot, swimming pool, and a 1980 Lincoln
Town Car, and a 1976 Chevrolet.
encumbered at that time.

None of the vehicles were

That none of the $8,000.00 - $10,000.00

cash, or the $9,000.00 received by the Plaintiff from sale of the
motor home was shared by Plaintiff with the Defendant.
10. That the parties had irreconcilable differences. That the
parties had conversation regarding distribution of the marital
assets, and the Defendant proposed that the Plaintiff retain as her
sole property all of the vehicles, money, house and lot, furniture
and household furnishings, and other personal property that he had
left with Plaintiff at the time Defendant went to Nevada, and that
the Plaintiff forego any claim to alimony from the Defendant. The
Defendant believed, until the Complaint for Divorce was filed by
Plaintiff that Plaintiff had agreed to accept the marital assets as
her own, in lieu of any claim for alimony from the Defendant.
By the time the Complaint in the above matter was filed by the
Plaintiff the Defendant had been transferred by his employer from
Las Vegas to Reno, Nevada.
11.

A Hearing on an Order to Show Cause was held in the

absence of the Defendant, he being in Nevada at his work, and an
Order for temporary alimony was ordered by the Court in the sum of
$1,500.00 per month.

That at the time of Trial of the case,
4

temporary

unpaid

alimony

had

accrued

in

the

total

sum

of

$27,507.00.
12.

That at the time of the marriage of the Plaintiff and the

Defendant the Plaintiff had an equity in a house and lot and the
Plaintiff and Defendant lived in the said house for a period of
time.

The Plaintiff house was sold.

During the time that the

Plaintiff and the Defendant lived in the Plaintiff's home the
Defendant
separation

made
of

the

mortgage

payments.

the parties the Defendant

That

following

sent monies

the

to the

Plaintiff for some time thereafter.
13.

That since the separation of the parties the Plaintiff

temporarily had a daughter and a child live with her, but otherwise
Plaintiff has lived in the home, alone, since the separation of the
parties. The home is a four bedroom, two level home, with swimming
pool, patio and covered porch, two car garage within the house, and
no mortgage is owing on the said real estate.

The house and lot

have been appraised twice, for $97,000 and for $85,000.00
14.

That neither the Plaintiff nor Defendant has much

retirement benefits accumulated, if any.
15.

That since the filing of the divorce the Defendant has

been transferred from Reno, Nevada by his employer to Phoenix,
Arizona, and Defendant has purchased a house and lot in Glendale,
Arizona,

and

a pick-up

truck and a boat in which there is

essentially no equity.
16.

That the Plaintiff has had the sole use of the parties

real estate, furniture, fixtures and all of the other personal
5

property accumulated by the parties during the marriage since the
separation of the parties in December of 1986.
17.

That the Plaintiff had not become accustomed to a high

standard of living during the marriage, it appearing from the
evidence that prior to Defendant's business failing in 1986 he was
grossing approximately $500.00 per week which was used for family
needs.

The parties income tax returns for years prior thereto

indicate actual income considerably less.
18.

Plaintiff is employed currently as she has been for some

time with the United States Treasury Department, Internal Revenue
Services

as a GS-5 Step One with a gross yearly

$16,973.00,

and

a

part-time

gross

pay

of

salary of

$8,280.00,

plus

unemployment for ten weeks giving her a gross income of $9,780.00
per year.
19.

Plaintiff testified that she would receive an increased

income when she returns to work in 1992.
20.

That the Plaintiff's employment history indicates that

she graduated from High School in 1953 and has basically worked in
clerking positions or assembly line positions, and has never earned
a high income.
21.

Plaintiff's

health

is

good

and

she

suffers

no

disabilities.
22. Defendant after reobtaining employment with Smiths became
a Store Manager, but he developed Rheumatoid Arthritis and has had
to down grade his job to that of a buyer, and his income will be
approximately $56,000.00 per annum.
6

23.

That Plaintiff filed an Affidavit of monthly expenses

showing present monthly expenses of $1,796.00 per month, however,
Plaintiff's Affidavit is more a wish list than a needs list.
An example of that fact is that the transportation figure that
the Plaintiff uses in her monthly expenses list shows $531.00 for
transportation expense though her testimony is that she drives very
little.

She also indicates that her personal expenses of $270.00

per month includes recreational and travel of over $130.00, and she
testified that she does not travel and spends very little money on
recreation.

In addition, she recites that her food expenses

totalled $350.00 per month which is not a realistic sum to spend
for one person, and reflects a desire on the part of the Plaintiff
to obtain high alimony rather than reasonably advising the Court of
the Plaintiff's actual expenses.
24.

That the Plaintiff claims that the house and lot in

Washington Terrace was deeded to her in exchange for any claim she
had against ownership of the grocery store business that was
operated by the Defendant and his brother.
25.

The Court finds, however, that the Deed was conveyed at

a time when the grocery business of the Defendant and his brother
was closing down and near Bankruptcy and ultimately went into
Bankruptcy, and that there was little, or no value in the business
at the time of the conveyance by Defendant of title by Quit Claim
Deed to the Plaintiff.
26.

The evidence shows that the Defendant still, at this

date, looks at the Plaintiff's children as his family, which fact
7

supports Defendants version that he wanted Plaintiff to join him in
Las Vegas to continue the marriage, but that Plaintiff refused to
do so.
27.

The Plaintiff claims that no such discussion of her

moving to Nevada took place, but Plaintiff does acknowledge that
Plaintiff and Defendant did discuss renting out the residence and
lot in Washington Terrace, Ogden, Utah.
The Court having entered its Findings of Fact now enters its

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

That the Court has jurisdiction in the above-entitled

matter.
2.

That the parties have irreconcilable differences one with

the other, and they should be divorced from each other, and the
divorce should be final upon execution and entry by the Court.
3. That the residence and lot located at 151 West 5400 South,
Washington Terrace, Weber County, State of Utah, is a marital
asset.
4.
5.
awarded,

That the said real estate should be sold.
That from the sale proceeds, the Plaintiff should be
the first $19,672.00, without

interest,

representing

Plaintiff's equity from her home prior to the marriage of the
parties.
6.
of the

That after the expenses of sale are deducted the balance
remaining

equity

should be divided,

Plaintiff, and one-half to the Defendant,
8

one-half

to the

7. That the Court determines that there is delinquent alimony
owed to the Plaintiff in the sum of $27,507.00.
8.

That the Plaintiff should be awarded on going alimony.

9.

That the Defendant should pay to the Plaintiff the sum of

$600.00 per month in liquidation of the delinquent alimony

sum of

$27,507.00, which the Court calculates will take 45.845 months, and
the Defendant

should not be required to pay interest on the

delinquent alimony.
10.

The payment of the back alimony will take Defendant 3.82

years, and by that time the Plaintiff should be employed on a full
time basis.
11.

That the Plaintiff should have the use and occupancy of

the parties house and lot until it is sold, and the Defendant's
lien on the equity in the real estate should not draw interest.
12.

That

accumulated,

neither

party

has

much

retirement

benefits

but each should have an interest in the others

retirement per the Woodward v. Woodward formula.
13. If the Plaintiff can obtain health and accident insurance
through her employment she should obtain that, but if the said
insurance is not available to the Plaintiff then the Defendant
should assist the Plaintiff in obtaining whatever medical benefit,
if any, she can through Defendants employment, at the Plaintiff's
expense.
14.

The Plaintiff in receiving $12,000.00 a year for 3.8

years from the Defendant, plus her current earnings on a part time
basis of $9,780.00

or more, will provide Plaintiff with a gross

9

income of almost $22,000,00 per year, which is almost equal to the
income which the parties were living on when the Defendant was
drawing $500.00 per week from his business prior to the separation
of the parties, and represents a monthly amount greater than the
amounts set out in the Affidavit of monthly expenses as filed by
the Plaintiff.

Therefore, the Plaintiff and the Defendant should

each pay their own attorneys fees ajsid costs.
DATED this clJd

day of ^rfuary,
inuary, 1992.

BY THEUCOURT:

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
On this

/H ^aay of January, 1992, I certify that I mailed,

postage prepaid, to the Plaintiff's attorney, David Burt Havas, at
his office at 2604 Madison Avenue, Ogden, Utah 84401, a copy of the
foregoing Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in the
above-entitled case.
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Tab 7

DONN E. CASSITY (#594)
ROMNEY, NELSON & CASSITY
Attorneys for Defendant
115 Social Hall Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 328-3261
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JOY A. HOAGLAND,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
VS.

COLIN G. HOAGLAND,
Defendant.

AMENDED ORDER

CASE NO. 890903214
RONALD 0. HYDE, JUDGE

)

On the 9th day of January, 1992, at the hour of 10:00 a.m. the
Motion of the Plaintiff to Amend Findirgs of Fact in the aboveentitled matter came on for Hearing, and the Plaintiff was present
and represented by her counsel, David Burt Havas, and the Defendant
was not present but was represented by his counsel, Donn E.
Cassity, and after argument in behalf of Plaintxtf's Motion by
Plaintiff's counsel, and the objection and argument of counsel for
the Defendant, Donn E. Cassity, the Court now being fully advised
in the premises does now
ORDER that the Findings of Fact heretofore executed by the
Court on the 4th day of December, 1991, be amended as to Paragraph
3 so as to be factually and grammatically correct, amended as to
Paragraph 9 of the Findings of Fact, wherein on page 4, third line
down, the words "wh^ch the Defendant believed had a value of
1

$12,000.00 to $15,000.00, but11

be deleted and the balance of said

sentence in said Paragraph 9 be left as written, and it is further
Ordered the Paragraph 10 of the Findings of Fact be amended by
deleting the first three lines of Paragraph 10 including the first
word of the fourth line of Paragraph 10, and insert in place of
those words as follows "That the Defendant testified that the
parties had conversation regarding distribution of the marital
assets, and that the Defendant", and starting with

the word

"proposed" in the fourth line of the Findings of Fact the balance
of the Paragraph 10 is to remain as previously written, excepting
that the last sentence cf Paragraph 1Q will read as follows:

"The

Defendant testified that until the Complaint for divorce was filed
by the Plaintiff that the Defendant believed that Plaintiff had
agreed with him to accept the marital assets as her own in lieu of
Plaintiff making any claim for alimony from the Defendant."
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the third and fourth sentences of
Paragraph 12 on Page 5 of the Findings of Fact shall be deleted.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that no further amendments proposed by
tne Plaintiff are approved, and are hereby denied,
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that in the event sale of the marital
real estate and division of the net proceeds thereof are upheld by
the Utah Court of Appeals, that in view of the fact that the real
estate of the parties commonly known as 151 West 5400 South
Washington Terrace, Weber County, State of Utah, is by decree of
divorce ordered to be sold, and since the Defendant's equity in the
said marital real estate will not, because of Plaintiff's appeal,
2

be timely paid to Defendant due to Plaintiff's appeal of the
Court's decision that interest on the net equity of the Defendant
in the said real estate, when it is sold, shall bear interest from
date of Plaintiff's Notice of Appeal at the rate of ten (10%)
percent per annum, which interest shall be paid to the Defendant in
addition to the principal amount of the net sales price awarded to
Defendant, following sale of the marital real estate, so. long as
the Defendant pays the Plaintiff alimony consistent with the
provisions of the Decree of Divorce, executed and entered by the
Court on December 4, 1991.
The Motion of the Plaintiff that she be awarded interest on
the Plaintiff's Judgment for delinquent alimony that has been
awarded Plaintiff by the Court should be and hereby is denied.
The Order of the Court as to payment of interest to the
Defendant, is not

intended by the Cojrt to limit any right

Defendant otherwise has with respect to the marital estate.
DATED this

day of

m

, 1992.

BY THE COURT:

JUDGE RONALD 0. HYDE

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that on the

/ 7 ^ day of April, 1992, I mailed,
3

postal prepaia, a cop, <* « ^

£oregoina

Oraer in the above-

case to the P o n t i f f hy - i U n g a copy thereof to her

Ogden, Utah 84401.
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DONN E. CASSITY (#594)
ROMNEY, NELSON & CASSITY
Attorneys for Defendant
115 Social Hall Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 328-3261

rn \c oo

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JOY A. HOAGLAND,

SECOND AMENDED FINDINGS
OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
vs.

CASE NO. 890903214
JUDGE: RONALD O. HYDE

COLIN G. HOAGLAND,
Defendant.

The

above-entitled

matter came on

for Trial before the

Honorable Ronald O. Hyde, Second Judicial District Court Judge for
Weber County, sitting without a Jury, at 9:30 a.m. on the 28th day
of October, 1991, and the Plaintiff, Joy A. Hoagland, and her
attorney, David Burt riavas, were present, and the Defendant, Colin
G. Hoagland, and his attorney, Donn E. Cassity, were present, and
the

Plaintiff

evidence,

and

having
the

presented

Defendant

exhibits and evidence

her

having

testimony,
presented

exhibits
his

and

testimony,

and the attorneys having made their closing

arguments and the Court now being full} informed in the premises,
now makes its

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

That the Plaintiff, Joy A. Hoagland, resided in Weber
1

County, State of Utah in excess of 90 days prior to the filing of
the Complaint in the above-entitled matter by the Plaintiff.
2.

That the Plaintiff and Defendant were married in Elko,

Nevada on the 5th day of September, 1973.
3.

That no children were born as issue of the marriage, but

from the time of the marriage of the Plaintiff and the Defendant
four children, each borne of the Plaintiff from a prior marriage
lived in the parties home and were raised by the Plaintiff and
Defendant,

with

the

Defendant,

Stej. -Father,

providing

the

substantial part of the support economically for the children,
during which time the Defendant developed a very close and loving
relationship with each of Plaintiff's children, which relationship
has continued to the present.
4.

That during the year of 1986 marital problems arose

between the parties, and they were separated twice for a few weeks
but were reunited near the end of 1986, at which time the Defendant
who was unemployed and whose grocery business had been closed, and
gone through Bankruptcy, left the residence of the parties in Ogden
Utah to seek employment, which he found in Las Vegas, Nevada.
5.

That when the Plaintiff married the Defendant he was an

employee of Smiths, a grocery company business, but later Defendant
quit his employment at Smiths and opened his own grocery store,
which business was operated until August of 1986, at which time the
Defendant

and his brother closed the business and filed the

Business Corporation in Bankruptcy.
6.

That prior to the closing of the business the Defendant
2

conveyed title to the residence and lot of the parties to the
Plaintiff as a security against the possibility that Creditors
might claim against the real and/or personal property of the
Plaintiff and Defendant.

No such claim was ever made by any

Creditor, however.
7. That during 1986 the parties developed serious problems in
their marriage relationship.
8.

That the Defendant in January of 1987 found gainful

employment in Las Vegas, Nevada, again working for Smiths in the
grocery business.

After being settled in Las Vegas in his new

employment, Defendant purchased a newly constructed residence and
lot, and invited the Plaintiff to come to Las Vegas.

At the time

of the visit the Defendant showed the Plaintiff the house, but when
the Defendant asked her to move to Nevada so they could live
together in the new~nome, she refused, stating, "My home is in
Ogden, Utah".

The Defendant told the Plaintiff that they could

lease the home in Ogden and thus retain it, and that a good
business friend in Ogden would manage it and make certain that it
was protected in their absence.

The Plaintiff refused to move to

Nevada, and effectively the parties were then separated and have
never since that period lived together. The marital parties have,
and have had irreconcilable differences since at least April of
1987.
9.

That at the time Defendant left the parties home in his

pursuit of employment in Nevada the Defendant took with him some
$300.00 plus dollars, together with a pick-up truck that was

3

encumbered and a motorcycle.

He left in the possession of the

Plaintiff approximately $8,000.00 to $10,000.00 in cash, the motor
home of the parties, which at a later time the Plaintiff sold for
$9,000.00 cash. The Defendant also left with the Plaintiff all of
the furniture, the house lot, swimming pool, and a 1980 Lincoln
Town Car, and a 1976 Chevrolet.
encumbered at that time.

None of the vehicles were

That none of the $8,000.00 - $10,000.00

cash, or the $9,000.00 received by the Plaintiff from sale of the
motor home was shared by Plaintiff with the Defendant.
10.

That the parties had irreconcilable differences.

That

the Defendant testified that the parties had conversation regarding
distribution of the marital assets, .and that the Defendant proposed
that the Plaintiff retain as her sole property all of the vehicles,
money, house and lot, furniture and household furnishings, and
other personal property that he had left with the Plaintiff at the
time Defendant went to Nevada, and that the Plaintiff forego any
claim to alimony from the Defendant.

The Defendant testified that

until the Complaint for Divorce was filed by the Plaintiff that he
believed that Plaintiff had agreed with him to accept the marital
assets as her own, in lieu of Plaintiff making any claim for
alimony from the Defendant.
By the time the Complaint in the above matter was filed by the
Plaintiff the Defendant had been transferred by his employer from
Las Vegas to Reno, Nevada.
11.

A Hearing on an Order to Show Cause was held in the

absence of the Defendant, he being in Nevada at his work, and an
4

Order for temporary alimony was ordered by the Court in the sum of
$1,500.00 per month.
temporary

unpaid

That at the time of Trial of the case,

alimony

had

accrued

in

the

total

sum

of

$27,507.00.
12. That at the time of the marriage of the Plaintiff and the
Defendant the Plaintiff had an equity in a house and lot and the
Plaintiff and Defendant lived in the said house for a period of
time.

The Plaintiff's house was soli.

separation

of

the parties the Defendant

That following the
sent monies

to the

Plaintiff for some time thereafter.
13.

That since the separation of the parties the Plaintiff

temporarily had a daughter and a child live with her, but otherwise
Plaintiff has lived ir the home, alone, since the separation of the
parties. The home is~a four bedroom, two level home, with swimming
pool, patio and covered porch, two car garage within the house, and
no mortgage is owing on the said real estate.

The house and lot

have been appraised twice, for $97,000.00 and for $85,000.00.
14.

That neither the Plaintiff nor Defendant has much

retirement benefits accumulated, if any.
15.

That since the filing of the divorce the Defendant has

been transferred from Reno, Nevada by his employer to Phoenix,
Arizona, and Defendant has purchased a house and lot in Glendale,
Arizona, and a pick-up truck, and a boat in which there is
essentially no equity.
16.

That the Plaintiff has had the sole use of the parties

real estate, furniture, fixtures and all of the other personal
5

property accumulated by the parties during the marriage since the
separation of the parties in December of 1986.
17.

That the Plaintiff had not become accustomed to a high

standard of living during the marriage, it appearing from the
evidence that prior to Defendant's business failing in 1986 he was
grossing approximately $500.00 per week which was usedifor family
needs.

The parties income tax returns for years prior thereto

indicate actual income considerably less.
18.

Plaintiff is employed currently as she has been for some

time with the United States Treasury Department, Internal Revenue
Service

as

$16,973.00,

a GS-5

Step

and

part-time

a

One with
gross

a gross yearly
pay

ojf

salary of

$8,280.00,

plus

unemployment for ten weeks giving her a gross income of $9,780.00
per year.
19.

Plaintiff ..testified that she would receive an increased

income when she returns to work in 1992.
20.

That the Plaintiff's employment history indicates that

she graduated from High School in 1953 and has basically worked in
clerking positions or assembly line positions, and has never earned
a high income.
21.

Plaintiff's

health

is

good

and

she

suffers

no

disabilities.
22. Defendant after reobtaining employment with Smiths became
a Store Manager, but he developed Rheumatoid Arthritis and has had
to down grade his job to that of a buyer, and his income will be
approximately $56,000.00 per annum.
6

23.

That Plaintiff filed an Affidavit of monthly expenses

showing present monthly expenses of $1,796.00 per month, however,
Plaintiff's Affidavit is more a wish list than a needs list.
An example of that fact is that the transportation figure that
the Plaintiff uses in her monthly expenses list shows $531.00 for
transportation expense though her testimony is that she drives very
little.

She also indicates that her personal expenses of $270.00

per month includes recreational and travel of over $130.00, and she
testified that she does not travel and spends very little money on
recreation.

In addition, she recites that her food expenses

totalled $350.00 per month which is not a realistic sum to spend
for one person, and reflects a desire on the part of the Plaintiff
to obtain high alimony rather than reasonably advising the Court of
the Plaintiff's actual expenses.
24.

That the Flaintiff claims that the house and lot in

Washington Terrace was deeded to her in exchange for any claim she
had against ownership of the grocery store business that was
operated by the Defendant and his brother.
25.

The Court finds, however, that the Deed was conveyed at

a time when the grocery business of the Defendant and his brother
was closing down and near Bankruptcy and ultimately went into
Bankruptcy, and that there was little, or no value in the business
at the time of the conveyance by Defendant of title by Quit-Claim
Deed to the Plaintiff.
26.

The evidence shows that the Defendant still, at this

date, looks at the Plaintiff's children as his family, which fact
7

supports Defendant's version that he wanted Plaintiff to join him
in Las Vegas to continue the marriage, but that Plaintiff refused
to do so.
27.

The Plaintiff claims that no such discussion of her

moving to Nevada took place, but Plaintiff does acknowledge that
Plaintiff and Defendant did discuss renting out the residence and
lot in Washington Terrace, Ogden, Utah.
The Court having entered its Findings of Fact now enters its

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

That the Court has jurisdiction in the above-entitled

matter.
2.

That the part.ies have irreconcilable differences one with

the other, and they should be divorced -from each other, and the
divorce should be final upon execution and entry by the Court.
3. That the residence and lot located at 151 West 5400 South,
Washington Terrace, Weber County, State of Utah, is a marital
asset.
4.
5.
awarded,

That the said real estate should be sold.
That from the sale proceeds, the Plaintiff should be
the first $19,672.00, without interest,

representing

Plaintiff's equity from her prior home prior to the marriage of the
parties.
6.

That after the expenses of sale are deducted the balance

of the remaining equity should be divided,
Plaintiff, and one-half to the Defendant.

8

one-half to the

7. That the Court determines that there is delinquent alimony
owed to the Plaintiff in the sum of $27,507-00.
8.

That the Plaintiff should be awarded on going alimony.

9.

That the Defendant should pay to the Plaintiff the sum of

$600.00 per month in liquidation of the delinquent alimony sum of
$27,507.00, which the Court calculates will take 45.845 months, and
the Defendant should not be required to pay interest on the
delinquent alimony.
10.

The payment of the back alimony will take Defendant 3.82

years, and by that time the Plaintiff should be employed on a full
time basis.
11.

That the Plaintiff should have the use and occupancy of

the parties house and lot until it is sold, and the Defendant's
lien on the equity in the real estate should not draw interest.
12.

That

accumulated,

neither

party

has

xnach

retirement

but each should have an interest

benefits

in the others

retirement per the Woodward v. Woodward formula.
13. If the Plaintiff can obtain health and accident insurance
through her employment she should obtain that, but if the said
insurance is not available to the Plaintiff then the Defendant
should assist the Plaintiff in obtaining whatever medical benefit,
if any, she can through Defendant's employment, at the Plaintiff's
expense•
14.

The Plaintiff in receiving $12,000.00 a year for 3.8

years from the Defendant, plus her current earnings on a part time
basis of $9,780.00, or more, will provide Plaintiff with a gross
9

income of almost $22,000.00 per year, which is almost equal to the
income which the parties were living on when the Defendant was
drawing $500.00 per week from his business prior to the separation
of the parties, and represents a monthly amount greater than the
amounts set out in the Affidavit of monthly expenses as filed by
the Plaintiff.

Therefore, the Plaintiff and the Defendant should

each pay their own attorneys fees and costs.

DATED this

*]

day of "^Y^J^A

S

, 1992,

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
On this

IH1^

day of April, 1992, I certify that I mailed,

postage prepaid, to the Plaintiff's attorney, David Burt Havas, at
his office at 2604 Madison Avenue, Ogden# Utah 84401, a copy of the
foregoing Second Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in
the above-entitled case.

Vi
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Tab 9

15-1-2

CONTRACTS AND OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL

15-1-2, 15-l-2a. Repealed.
Repeals. — Sections 15-1-2, 15-l-2a (L.
1907, ch. 46, § 2; C.L. 1907, § 1241x; C.L.
1917, § 3321; R.S. 1933,44-0-2; L. 1935, ch. 42,
§ 1; C. 1943, 44-0-2; L. 1953, ch. 24, §§ 1, 2;

1955, ch. 20, § 1; 1965, ch. 25, § 1), relating to
maximum interest rates on loans and conditional sales contracts, were repealed by Laws
1969, ch. 18, § 9.103.

15-1-3. Calculated by the year.
Whenever in any statute or deed, or written or verbal contract, or in any
public or private instrument whatever, any certain rate of interest is mentioned and no period of time is stated, interest shall be calculated at the rate
mentioned by the year.
History: L. 1907, ch. 46, § 7; C.L. 1907,
§ 1241x5; C.L, 1917, § 3326; R.S. 1933 & C.
1943, 44-0-3.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 47 CJ.S. Interest 5 42.
Key Numbers. — Interest *» 40.

15-1-4. Interest on judgments.
Any judgment rendered on a lawful contract shall conform thereto and shall
bear the interest agreed upon by the parties, which shall be specified in the
judgment; other judgments shall bear interest at the rate of 12% per annum.
History: L. 1907, ch. 46, § 11; C.L. 1907,
§ 1241x9; C.L. 1917, § 3330; R.S. 1933 & C.
1943, 44-0-4; L. 1981. ch. 73, § 2.
Amendment Notes. — The 1981 amendment increased the interest rate from 8% to
12%.

Cross-References. — Interest to be ineluded in judgment entry, Rules of Civil Proce^^ R u ] e 5 4 ( e ).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Allowance of interest before judgment.
Amendment of judgment.
Collection of interest.
Eminent domain.
Estates of decedents.
Federal court judgment.
Interest during pendency of appeal.
Late payment of property division in divorce action.
Personal judgments.
Prejudgment interest.
Reinstatement of judgment.
Renewal..of judgment.
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Tab 10

DIVORCE

30-3-3

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cf*ifc\ treatment.
Acts constituting cruel conduct sufficient to
cause great mental distress need not be aggravated and more severe when directed toward
the husband than when directed toward the
wife. Hansen v. Hansen, 537 P.2d 491 (Utah
1975).

ANALYSIS

Both parties at fault.
Cruel treatment.
Both parties at fault.
Marriage may be dissolved by making a
grant of divorce to each party where each was
equally at fault.* Mullins v. Mullins, 26 Utah
2d 82, 485 P.2d 663 (1971).

30-3-3. Temporary alimony and suit money.
The court may order either party to pay to the clerk a sum of money for the
separate support and maintenance of the adverse party and the children, and
to enable such party to prosecute or defend the action.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1210;
C.L. 1917, § 2998; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943,
40-3-3.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Appealability of order.
Appeal from older.
Attorney fees.
Attorney fees for appeal.
Attorney's lien on alimony.
Contempt proceedings.
Contesting petitioner for modification.
Costs and expenses on appeal.
Discretion of trial court.
Enforcement of order or decree.
Jurisdiction.
Mandamus.
Order of court.
Stipulation and effect thereof.
Appealability of order.
Formal order made in divorce action, called a
^judgment" directing that judgment be entered
for benefit of defendant's attorneys, is not final
and appealable. Rolando v. District Court, 72
Utah 459, 271 P. 225 (1928).
Appeal from order.
Where there were no findings or evidence in
record as to attorney's fees, Supreme Court remanded issue for disposition by trial court but
allowed wife's attorney $100 for services rendered with reference to husband's appeal from
judgment modifying divorce decree. Parish v.
Parish, 84 Utah 390, 35 P.2d 999 (1934).
Supreme Court assumed that evidence supported award of suit money to wife where no
testimony as to wife's need was before the
court on appeal on judgment roll from the decree of no cause of action in husband and
awarding of expenses of suit, attorney's fees

and temporary alimony to wife. Weiss v. Weiss,
111 Utah 353, 179 P.2d 1005 (1947).
Attorney fees.
Allowance of $200 as wife's attorney's fee in
divorce proceeding was not inadequate even
though husband- was worth approximately
$40,000, where proceedings from time of comniencement until entry of decree lasted less
than two months and trial itself was completed
in less than two days. Blair v. Blair, 40 Utah
306, 121 P. 19, 38 L.R.A. (n.s.) 269, 1914D
Ann. Cas. 989 (1912).
Where decree of divorce was obtained by
rnother of minor children against father, who
was required to pay certain sum periodically
for support, caie, maintenance, and education
of such children, and he, without sufficient
cause, refused to comply with decree, as result
of which mother was compelled to bring proceedings against him, father was required to
pay counsel fees in such proceedings. Tribe v.
Tribe, 59 Utah 112, 202 P. 213 (1921)."
Court properly awarded attorney's fees to
wife in subsequent proceeding on application of
wife for arrears in alimony. Christensen v.
Christensen, 65 Utah 597, 239 P. 501 (1925).
Fifty dollars was a reasonable fee where wife
petitioned to require husband to show cause
why he should not be punished for contempt for
failure to pay support money and husband filed
cross-petition for modification of decree and
where it was shown that wife was without
means to prosecute the cause or pay counsel.
Scott v. Scott, 105 Utah 376, 142 P.2d 198
(1943).
While fact that wife is able to pay expenses
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eU<Htb V
30-3-10.6

HUSBAND AND WIFE

(3) If the court finds that an action under this section is filed or answered
frivolously and in a manner designed to harass the other party, the court shall
assess attorney's fees as costs against the offending party.
History: C. 1953, 30-3-10.4, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 106, § 5; 1990, ch. 112, § 2.
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amendment, effective March 8,1990, rewrote the first
two sentences in Subsection (2), which had
read "(a) The order of joint legal custody is terminated upon the filing of a motion for termination by: (i) both parents; or (ii) one parent,

when notice of the motion is sent by certified
mail to the other parent and an affidavit is
filed with the motion, indicating the motion
has been mailed as required by this subsection.
(b) The order of joint legal custody shall be replaced by the court with an order of sole legal
custody under Section 30-30-10."

30-3-10.6. Payment under child support order — Judgment.
(1) Each payment or installment of child or spousal support under any child
support order, as defined by Subsection 62A-11-401(3), is, on and after the
date it is due:
(a) a judgment with the same attributes and effect of any judgment of a
district court, except as provided in Subsection (2);
(b) entitled, as a judgment, to full faith and credit in this and in any
other jurisdiction; and
(c) not subject to retroactive modification by this or any other jurisdiction, except as provided in Subsection (2).
(2) A child or spousal support payment under a child support order may be
modified with respect to any period during which a petition for modification is
pending, but only from the date notice of that petition was given to the obligee, if the obligor is the petitioner, or to the obligor, if the obligee is the
petitioner.
(3) For purposes of this section, jurisdiction" means a state or political
subdivision, a territory or possession of the United States, the District of
Columbia, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
(4) The judgment provided for in Subsection (l)(a), to be effective and enforceable as a lien against the real property interest of any third party relying
on the public record, shall be docketed in the district court in accordance with
Sections 78-22-1 and 62A-11-311.
History: C. 1953, 30-3-10.6, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 117, § 1; 1988, ch. 1, § 3; 1988, ch.
203, § 1; 1989, ch. 62, § 1; ch. 115, $ 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amendment by ch. 62, effective April 24,1989, substituted "62A-11-311" for "62A-11-309" at the
end of Subsection (4).
The 1989 amendment by ch. 115, effective

April 24,1989, deleted "reduced to an administrative or judicial judgment for a specific
amount and" before "docketed" in Subsection
(4).
This section is set out as reconciled by the
Office of Legislative Research and General
Counsel.
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62A-11-401

SOCIAL SERVICES CODE

(c) The court shall then determine whether ORS must release the location and address of the custodial parent and any children, and issue an
order accordingly.
History: C. 1953, 62A-11-331, enacted by
L. 1989, ch. 108, § 1; recodified as C. 1953,
62A-11-332.
compiler's Notes. — This section was enacted as § 62A-11-331, but was recodified by
the Office of Legislative Research and General

Counsel because of the enactment at the same
session of another § 62A-11-331.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 108 Decame effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

PART 4
INCOME WITHHOLDING
62A-11-401. Definitions.
As used in this part:
(1) "Child" means a son or daughter who is under the age of 18 years,
or who is physically or mentally handicapped and incapable of earning
income sufficient to support himself.
(2) "Child support" means a financial obligation ordered by a court or
administrative body for the support of a child, including current periodic
payments and all arrearages. Child support includes court ordered obligations for the support of a spouse or former spouse with whom the child
resides if the spousal support is collected with the child support.
(3) "Child support order" means a judgment, decree, or order of a court
or administrative body whether interlocutory or final, whether or not
prospectively or retroactively modifiable, whether incidental to a proceeding for divorce, judicial or legal separation, separate maintenance, paternity, guardianship, civil protection, or otherwise, which:
(a) establishes or modifies child support;
(b) reduces child support arrearages to judgment; or
(c) establishes child support or confirms a child support order under Chapter 31, Title 77.
(4) "Delinquent" or "delinquency" means that child support in an
amount at least equal to current child support payable for one month is
overdue.
(5) "Income" means earnings or compensation paid or payable for personal services whether denominated as wages, salary, commission, bonus,
or contract payment, or denominated as advances on future wages, salary,
commission, bonus, contract payment, or otherwise. "Income" specifically
includes, but is not limited to:
(a) all gain derived from capital assets, labor, or both, including
profit gained through sale or conversion of capital assets;
(b) periodic payments made under pension or retirement programs
or insurance policies of any type;
(c) unemployment compensation benefits; and
(d) workers' compensation benefits.
(6) "Jurisdiction" means a state or political subdivision, a territory or
possession of the United States, the District of Columbia, or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
246
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62A-11-404

(7) "Obligor" means a person owing a duty of child support.
(8) "Obligee" means a person to whom a duty of support is owed, or who
is entitled to reimbursement of support or public assistance.
(9) "Office" means the Office of Recovery Services.
(10) "Payor" means an employer or any person who is a source of income to an obligor.
History: C. 1953, 62A-11-401, enacted by
L. 1988, ch. 1 § 314; 1989, ch. 62, § 20.
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amendment effective April 24,1989 rewrote Subsec-

T^^^i

ment programs, or insurance policies, and unemployment compensation insurance benefits";
and rewrote Subsection (8) which read M,Obh. means a
n or entlt
e n t l t l e d to re_

, J S J ^ S S — tld suppof ;ncl»ding an agency

denominated as wages, salary, commission, bonus, contract payment, or otherwise, including
gam derived from capital assets, periodic payments made under pension programs, retire-

OT

™oth?T J""«liction
Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, ch 1, § 408
makes the act effective on January 19, 1988

62A-11-402. Administrative procedures.
Because the procedures of this part are mandated by federal law they shall
be applied for the purposes specified in this part and control over any other
statutory administrative procedures.
History: C. 1953, 62A-11-402, enacted by
L. 1988, ch. 1, § 315.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, ch 1, § 408
makes the act effective on January 19, 1988

62A-11-403. Provision for income withholding in child
support order.
When a child support order is issued or modified in this state after July 1,
1985, it shall authorize the withholding of income as a means of collecting
child support. The order shall specify that when child support is delinquent, as
defined by Subsection 62A-11-40H4), appropriate income withholding procedures shall apply to existing and future payors, and that all withheld income
shall be submitted to the office. This provision of the order may be effective
until the obligor no longer owes child support to the obligee.
History: C. 1953, 62A-11-403, enacted by
L. 1988, ch. 1, § 316.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, ch 1, § 408
makes the act effective on January 19, 1988

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 79 Am Jur 2d Welfare
Laws § 81

62A-11-404. Procedure for obligee seeking income withholding.
(1) An obligee may apply for income withholding services by the office,
under Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, or seek income withholding in a
district court of competent jurisdiction, when a delinquency occurs under a
child support order which includes authorization of income withholding. In
order to proceed with a civil action, the obligee shall petition the court for a
247

Tab 13

Rule 52

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

instructions. Morgan v. Quailbrook Condominium Co., 704 P.2d 573 (Utah 1985).
Written instructions.
—Failure to tender.
Waiver.
Where plaintiff had failed to tender a written instruction on burden of proof he could not
claim error in the lack of such instruction. Fuller v. Zinik Sporting Goods Co., 538 P.2d 1036
(Utah 1975).
Cited in Wellman v. Noble, 12 Utah 2d 350,
366 P.2d 701 (1961); Hill v. Cloward, 14 Utah
2d 55, 377 P.2d 186 (1962); Ortega v. Thomas,
14 Utah 2d 296, 383 P.2d 406 (1963); Meier v.
Christensen, 15 Utah 2d 182, 389 P.2d 734
(1964); Memmott v. U.S. Fuel Co., 22 Utah 2d
356, 453 P.2d 155 (1969); Telford v. Newell J.
Olsen & Sons Constr. Co., 25 Utah 2d 270, 480

P.2d 462 (1971); Flynn v. W.P. Harlin Constr.
Co., 29 Utah 2d 327, 509 P.2d 356 (1973);
McGinn v. Utah Power & Light Co., 529 P.2d
423 (Utah 1974); Henderson v. Meyer, 533 P.2d
290 (Utah 1975); Lamkin v. Lynch, 600 P.2d
530 (Utah 1979); State v. Hall, 671 P.2d 201
(Utah 1983); Highland Constr. Co. v. Union
Pac. R.R., 683 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1984); Gill v.
Timm, 720 P.2d 1352 (Utah 1986); Penrod v.
Carter, 737 P.2d 199 (Utah 1987); King v.
Fereday, 739 P.2d 618 (Utah 1987); State v.
Cox, 751 P.2d 1152 (Utah Ct. App. 1988);
Ramon ex rel. Ramon v. Farr, 770 P.2d 131
(Utah 1989); Anton v. Thomas, 806 P.2d 744
(Utah Ct. App. 1991); Reeves v. Gentile. 813
P.2d 111 (Utah 1991); Hodges v. Gibson Prods.
Co., 811 P.2d 151 (Utah 1991); Home Sav. &
Loan v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 166 Utah Adv.
Rep. 26 (Ct. App. 1991).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 75A Am. J u r . 2d Trial
§ 1077 et seq.
C.J.S. — 88 C.J.S. Trial §§ 266 to 448.
A.L.R. — Propriety and prejudicial effect of
instructions in civil case as affected by the
manner in which they are written, 10 A.L.R.3d
501.
Sufficiency of evidence, in personal injury
action, to prove future pain and suffering and
to warrant instructions to jury thereon, 18
A.L.R.3d 10.
Sufficiency of evidence, in personal injury
action, to prove impairment of earning capacity and to warrant instructions to jury thereon,
18 A.L.R.3d 88.
Sufficiency of evidence, in personal injury
action, to prove permanence of injuries and to
warrant instructions to jury thereon, 18
A.L.R.3d 170.
Propriety and effect, in eminent domain proceeding, of instruction to the jury as to landowner's unwillingness to sell property, 20
A.L.R.3d 1081.
Verdict-urging instructions in civil case

stressing desirability and importance of agreement, 38 A.L.R.3d 1281.
Verdict-urging instructions in civil case
commenting on weight of majority view or authorizing compromise, 41 A.L.R.3d 845.
Verdict-urging instructions in civil case admonishing jurors to refrain from intransigence
or reflecting on integrity or intelligence of jurors, 41 A.L.R.3d 1154.
Construction of statutes or rules making
mandatory the use of pattern or uniform approved jury instructions, 49 A.L.R.3d 128.
Necessity and propriety of instructing on alternative theories of negligence or breach of
warranty, where instruction on strict liability
in tort is given in products liability case, 52
A.L.R.3d 101.
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, construction and effect of provision in Rule 5 1 , and similar state rules, that counsel be given opportunity to make objections to instructions out of
hearing of jury, 1 A.L.R. Fed. 310.
Key Numbers. — Trial «=» 182 to 296.

Rule 52. Findings by the court.
(a) Effect In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an
advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its
conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule
58A; in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the
grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of
review. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence,
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given
to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.
The findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be
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considered as the findings of the court. It will be sufficient if the findings of
fact and conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open court following the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of
decision filed by the court. The trial court need not enter findings of fact and
conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule 41(b). The
court shall, however, issue a brief written statement of the ground for its
decision on all motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59
when the motion is based on more than one ground.
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after
entry of judgment the court may amend its findings or make additional findings and may amend the judgment accordingly. The motion may be made with
a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. When findings of fact are made
in actions tried by the court without a jury, the question of the sufficiency of
the evidence to support the findings may thereafter be raised whether or not
the party raising the question has made in the district court an objection to
such findings or has made either a motion to amend them, a motion for judgment, or a motion for a new trial.
(c) Waiver of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Except in actions
for divorce, findings of fact and conclusions of law may be waived by the
parties to an issue of fact:
(1) by default or by failing to appear at the trial;
(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause;
(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in the minutes.
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.)
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 52, F.R.C.P.
Cross-References. — Masters, Rule 53.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Adoption.
—Abandonment of contract.
—Advisory verdict.
—Breach of contract.
—Child custody.
—Contempt.
—Credibility of witnesses.
—Denial of motion.
—Divorce decree modifications.
—Easement
—Evidentiary disputes.
—Juvenile action.
—Material issues.
Harmless error.
—Submission by prevailing party.
Court's discretion.
—Water dispute.
Findings of state engineer.
Amendment.
—Motion.
Conformance with original findings.
New trial.
Notice of appeal.

Time.
Tolling of appeal period.
When made.
—Overruling or vacation.
Another district judge.
Lack of notice.
Child custody awards.
Criminal cases.
Criminal contempt.
Effect.
—Preclusion of summary judgment.
—Relation to pleadings.
Failure to object to findings.
How findings entered.
Judicial review.
—Equity cases.
—Standard of review.
Conclusions of law.
Criminal cases.
Criminal trials.
Findings of facts by jury.
Intent.
Juvenile proceedings.
Purpose of rule.
Stipulations.

147

Tab 14

Rule 54

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

eree's order to participate in appeal secured by
another creditor, 22 A.L.R.3d 914.
Power of successor or substituted master or
.
, ,
* • J
r
A
referee to render decision or enter judgment on
testimony heard by predecessor, 70 A.L.R.3d
1079
Referee's failure to file report within time

specified by statute, court order, or stipulation
as terminating reference, 71 A.L.R.4th 889.
are
^
'^xceptional conditions" justifying
reference under Rule of Civil Procedure 53(b>
i A T P Fed 922
R e y N m n b e r s . _ E q u i t y „ 3 9 3 to 3 9 5 ? 4 0 1 >
404 to 406; Reference *=» 3 et seq., 35 to 77, 99
et seq.

PART VIL
JUDGMENT.
Rule 54. Judgments; costs.
(a) Definition; form. "Judgment" as used in these rules includes a decree
and any order from which an appeal lies. A judgment need not contain a
recital of pleadings, the report of a master, or the record of prior proceedings.
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and^or involving multiple parties.
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, and'or when multiple
parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to
one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express
determination by the court that there is no just reason for delay and upon an
express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated,
which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of
fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the
claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision
at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the
rights and liabilities of all the parties.
(c) Demand for judgment.
(1) Generally. Except as to a party against whom a judgment is entered by default, every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the
party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not
demanded such relief in his pleadings. It may be given for or against one
or more of several claimants; and it may, when the justice of the case
requires it, determine the ultimate rights of the parties on each side as
between or among themselves.
(2) Judgment by default. A judgment by default shall not be different
in kind from, or exceed in amount, that specifically prayed for in the
demand for judgment.
(d) Costs.
(1) To whom awarded. Except when express provision therefor is
made either in a statute of this state or in these rules, costs shall be
allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise
directs; provided, however, where an appeal or other proceeding for review is taken, costs of the action, other than costs in connection with such
appeal or other proceeding for review, shall abide the final determination
of the cause. Costs against the state of Utah, its officers and agencies
shall be imposed only to the extent permitted by law.
(2) How assessed. The party who claims his costs must within five
days after the entry of judgment serve upon the adverse party against
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demanded such relief in his pleadings. It may be given for or against one
or more of several claimants; and it may, when the justice of the case
requires it, determine the ultimate rights of the parties on each side as
between or among themselves.
(2) Judgment by default. A judgment by default shall not be different
in kind from, or exceed in amount, that specifically prayed for in the
demand for judgment.
(d) Costs.
(1) To whom awarded. Except when express provision therefor is
made either in a statute of this state or in these rules, costs shall be
allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise
directs; provided, however, where an appeal or other proceeding for review is taken, costs of the action, other than costs in connection with such
appeal or other proceeding for review, shall abide the final determination
of the cause. Costs against the state of Utah, its officers and agencies
shall be imposed only to the extent permitted by law.
(2) How assessed. The party who claims his costs must within five
days after the entry of judgment serve upon the adverse party against
whom costs are claimed, a copy of a memorandum of the items of his costs
and necessary disbursements in the action, and file with the court a like
memorandum thereof duly verified stating that to affiant's knowledge the
items are correct, and that the disbursements have been necessarily incurred in the action or proceeding. A party dissatisfied with the costs
claimed may, within seven days after service of the memorandum of costs,
file a motion to have the bill of costs taxed by the court in which the
judgment was rendered.
A memorandum of costs served and filed after the verdict, or at the
time of or subsequent to the service and filing of the findings of fact and
conclusions of law, but before the entry of judgment, shall nevertheless be
considered as served and filed on the date judgment is entered.
(3), (4) [Deleted.]
(e) Interest and costs to be included in the judgment. The clerk must
include in any judgment bigned by him any interest on the verdict or decision
from the time it was rendered, and the costs, if the same have been taxed or
ascertained. The clerk must, within two days after the costs have been taxed
or cifc'jeiuilneu. m any case where not included m the judgment, insen the
amount thereof in a blank left in the judgment for that purpose, and make a
similar notation thereof in the register of actions and in the judgment docket
(Amended effective January 1, 1985.)
Amendment Notes. — Subdivisions (d)(3)
and (d)(4), relating to the award of costs by the
appellate court and costs in original proceedmgs before the Supreme Court, were repealed
with the adoption of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, effective January 1, 1985 See,
now, Rule 34(d), Utah R App P.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 54, F R C P.

Cross-References. — Continuances, discre
tion to require payment of costs, Rule 40(b>
Judges' retirement fee, taxing as costs
§ 49-6-301
State, payment of costs awarded against
§ 78-27-13
Stay of judgment upon multiple claims, Rule
62(h)
Witness fees, taxing as costs, § 21-5-8
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Rule 58A

jjUle 57. Declaratory judgments.
The procedure for obtaining a declaratory judgment pursuant to Chapter 33
;fitle 78, U.C.A. 1953, shall be in accordance with these rules, and the right
Atrial by jury may be demanded under the circumstances and in the manner
^vided in Rules 38 and 39. The existence of another adequate remedy does
[ .preclude a judgment for declaratory relief in cases where it is appropriate.
^ e court may order a speedy hearing of an action for a declaratory judgment
nd may advance it on the calendar.
r0 mpil e r s Notes. — This rule is similar to
& 57, F.R.C.P.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in Oil Shale Corp. v. Larson, 20 Utah
<, 369, 438 P.2d 540 (1968).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
^m. Jur. 2d. — 22A Am. Jur. 2d DeclaraJudgments §§ 183, 186, 203 et seq.
C.J.S. — 26 C.J.S. Declaratory Judgments
. 17. 18, 104, 155.
A.L.R» — Right to jury trial in action for

jry

declaratory relief in state court, 33 A.L.R.4th
146.
Key Numbers. — Declaratory Judgment «=»
41, 42, 251, 367.

Rule 58A, Entry.
(a) Judgment u p o n the verdict of a jury. Unless the court otherwise
jirects and subject to the provisions of Rule 54(b), judgment upon the verdict
of a jury shall be forthwith signed by the clerk and filed. If there is a special
,erdict or a general verdict accompanied by answers to interrogatories re:urned by a jury pursuant to Rule 49, the court shall direct the appropriate
udgment which shall be forthwith signed by the clerk and filed.
lb) Judgment in other cases. Except as provided in Subdivision (a) hereof
md Subdivision (b)(1) of Rule 55, all judgments shall be signed by the judge
and filed with the clerk.
(c) When judgment entered; notation in register of actions and judgment docket. A judgment is complete and shall be deemed entered for all
Durposes, except the creation of a lien on real property, when the same is
signed and filed as herein above provided. The clerk shall immediately make
a notation of the judgment in the register of actions and the judgment docket.
(d) Notice of signing or entry of judgment. The prevailing party shall
oromptly give notice of the signing or entry of judgment to all other parties
and shall file proof of service of such notice with the clerk of the court. However, the time for filing a notice of appeal is not affected by the notice requirement of this provision.
(e) Judgment after death of a party. If a party dies after a verdict or
decision upon any issue of fact and before judgment, judgment may nevertheess be rendered thereon.
(f) Judgment by confession. Whenever a judgment by confession is authorized by statute, the party seeking the same must file with the clerk of the
court in which the judgment is to be entered a statement, verified by the
defendant, to the following effect:
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(1) If the judgment to be confessed is for money due or to become due, it
shall concisely state the claim and that the sum confessed therefor is
justly due or to become due;
(2) If the judgment to be confessed is for the purpose of securing the
plaintiff against a contingent liability, it must state concisely the claim
and that the sum confessed therefor does not exceed the same;
(3) It must authorize the entry of judgment for a specified sum.
The clerk shall thereupon endorse upon the statement, and enter in the
judgment docket, a judgment of the court for the amount confessed, with costs
of entry, if any.
(Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985; Jan. 1, 1987.)
Advisory Committee Note. — Paragraph
(d) is intended to remedy the difficulties suggested by Thompson v. Ford Motor Co., 14
Utah 2d 334, 384 P.2d 109 (1963).
Compiler's Notes. — The subject matter of
this rule is dealt with in Rules 58 and 79(a),
F.R.C.P.

Cross-References. — Judgment against
person dying after verdict or decision, not a
lien on realty, § 78-22-1.1.
Judgment by confession authorized, § 78-223.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Death of party.
—During appeal.
Other cases.
—Unsigned minute entry.
When entered.
—Completion.
Formal judgment.
Notice to parties.
—Filing.
—Unsigned minute entry.
Cited.
Death of party.
—During appeal.
Where jury returned verdict for plaintiff but
judge entered judgment notwithstanding the
verdict for defendant, death of plaintiff during
appeal did not abate appeal since court, under
Subdivision (e) of this rule, could still enter
judgment on verdict if judgment notwithstanding verdict were reversed. Bates v. Burns, 2
Utah 2d 362, 274 P.2d 569 (1954).
Other cases.
—Unsigned minute entry.
An appeal from a summary judgment was
dismissed where the record showed only an
unsigned minute entry and no judgment or order signed by the judge. Wisden v. City of
Salina, 696 P.2d 1205 (Utah 1985).
When entered.
—Completion.
Formal judgment
Whether plaintiff had right to have action

dismissed upon payment of costs presented judicial question to be determined by court, so
that where court ordered case dismissed and
clerk entered "case dismissed" in register of
actions but formal judgment had not been entered, action was still pending between parties.
Yusky v. Chief Consol. Mining Co., 65 Utah
269, 236 P. 452 (1925).
Notice to parties.
Under this rule, a judgment is complete and
is deemed entered for all purposes when it is
signed and filed, and not when notice is received by the parties. In re Bundy's Estate, 121
Utah 299, 241 P.2d 462 (1952).
Where a losing party moved to set aside the
judgment against her within about a month
after learning that the judgment had been entered, and her ignorance of the judgment until
that time was due in part to a lack of notice
that the prevailing party was required to provide pursuant to this rule, her motion was
timely under Rule 60(b). Workman v. Nagle
Constr., Inc., 802 P.2d 749 (Utah Ct. App.
1990).
—Filing.
For cases discussing necessity of serving proposed findings, judgments, and orders on opposing counsel in compliance with former Rule
2.9, Rules of Practice — Dist. and Cir. Ct. (now
Rule 4-504, Rules of Judicial Administration),
see Bigelow v. Ingersoll, 618 P.2d 50 (Utah
1980); Wayne Garff Constr. Co. v. Richards,
706 P.2d 1065 (Utah 1985); Calfo v. D.C. Stewart Co., 717 P.2d 697 (Utah 1986); Larsen v.
Larsen, 674 P.2d 116 (Utah 1983).
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Rule 4. Appeal as of right: when taken.
(a) Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case in which an appeal
is permitted as a matter of right from the trial court to the appellate court, the
notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the trial
court within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed
from. However, when a judgment or order is entered in a statutory forcible
entry or unlawful detainer action, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3
shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 10 days after the date of
entry of the judgment or order appealed froqj^
(b) Motions post judgment or order. If a timely motion under the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure is filed in the trial court by any party (1) for judgment under Rule 50(b); (2) under Rule 52(b) to amend or make additional
findings of fact, whether or not an alteration of the judgment would be required if the motion is granted; (3) under Rule 59 to alter or amend the
judgment; or (4) under Rule 59 for a new trial, the time for appeal for all
parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial or granting
or denying any other such motion. Similarly, if a timely motion under the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure is filed in the trial court by any party (1)
under Rule 24 for a new trial; or (2) under Rule 26 for an order, after judgment, affecting the substantial rights of a defendant, the time for appeal for
all parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial or granting or denying any other such motion. A notice of appeal filed before the
disposition of any of the above motions shall have no effect. A new notice of
appeal must be filed within the prescribed time measured from the entry of
the order of the trial court disposing of the motion as provided above.
(c) Filing prior to entry of judgment or order* Except as provided in
paragraph (b) of this rule, a notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a
decision, judgment, or order but before the entry of the judgment or order of
the trial court shall be treated as filed after such entry and on the day thereof.
(d) Additional or cross-appeal. If a timely notice of appeal is filed by a
party, any other party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date
on which the first notice of appeal was filed, or within the time otherwise
prescribed by paragraph (a) of this rule, whichever period last expires.
(e) Extension of time to appeal. The trial court, upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause, may extend the time for filing a notice of appeal
upon motion filed not later than 30 days after the expiration. of the time
prescribed by paragraph (a) of this rule. A motion filed before expiration of the
prescribed time may be ex parte unless the trial court otherwise requires.
Notice of a motion filed after expiration of the prescribed time shall be given
to the other parties in accordance with the rules of practice of the trial court.
No extension shall exceed 30 days past the prescribed time or 10 days from the
date of entry of the order granting the motion, whichever occurs later.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
Attorney fees.
Cross-appealExtension of time to appeal.
Filing of notice.
Filing with county clerk.

Final order or judgment.
Post-judgment motions.
Premature notice.
Reconsideration of order.
Timeliness of notice.
—Date of notice.
Cited.
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not confer jurisdiction on the court. Anderson
v. Schwendiman, 764 P.2d 999 (Utah Ct. App.
1988).
Reconsideration of order.
The Court of Appeals declined to reconsider
and overrule its prior denial of the state's request to dismiss an appeal as untimely. State
v. Yates, 765 P.2d 251 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
Timeliness of notice.
Notice of appeal filed within the required period from date of entry of order of contempt was
filed timely and Supreme Court had jurisdiction to hear appeal concerning the contempt
order. Burgers v. Maiben, 652 P.2d 1320 (Utah
1982).
An untimely motion for a new trial had no
effect on the running of the time for filing a
notice of appeal. Burgers v. Maiben, 652 P.2d
1320 (Utah 1982).
Case was temporarily remanded to the juvenile court in order to allow that court to make
a determination whether an order extending
the time for appeal should be entered by the
juvenile court under this rule, when it was not
apparent whether the notice of appeal was either timely filed or deemed timely filed by the
juvenile court. State In re M.S., 781 P.2d 1287
(Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Where plaintiff, one day after the voluntary
withdrawal of its motion for directed verdict,
filed a notice of appeal and also moved for an
extension of time in which to file a notice of
appeal, the notice of appeal was timely filed,
irrespective of whether the order granting ad-

ditional time for filing had a nunc pro lu**
effect. Guardian State Bank v. Stangl T*i
P.2d 1 (Utah 1989).
Notice of appeal placed in the prison ma;! b>
an incarcerated criminal defendant within t>*
30-day period set forth in this rule wan rwt
timely, where the notice was filed in the di*
trict court more than 30 days after entry of Uw
judgment being appealed. State v. Palmer. 7?*
P.2d 521 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
By using the disjunctive "or," Subdivision c
clearly allows the notice of appeal to be filnd
after the announcement of either a decision. •
judgment, or an order. "Decision" is broadlj
defined to cover final judgments, interlocutor?
orders, or "the first step leading to a judf
ment," and includes a trial court's determina
tion of guilt. City of St. George v. Smith. 814
P.2d 1154 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
Appellant'6 notice of appeal, which wasftlid
after the announcement of the decision of gmh
but before sentencing, was timely filed undr?
Subdivision (c). City of St. George v. Smit*>
814 P.2d 1154 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
—Date of notice.
In determining whether a notice of appeal n
timely filed and establishes jurisdiction in an
appellate court, the appellate court is bound b>
the filing date on the notice of appeal transmit
ted to it by the trial court. State In re M.S., 761
P.2d 1287 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Cited in Neerings v. Utah State Bar, 166
Utah Adv. Rep. 13 (1991).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — When will premature notice of appeal be retroactively validated in federal civil
case, 76 A.L.R. Fed. 199.

Rule 5, Discretionary appeals from interlocutory orders.
(a) Petition for permission to appeal. An appeal from an interlocutor)
order may be sought by any party by filing a petition for permission to app*a
from the interlocutory order with the clerk of the appellate court with jurisdiction over the case within 20 days after the entry of the order of the trial court.
with proof of service on all other parties to the action.
r
(b) Fees and copies of petition. The petitioner shall file with the Clerk o
the Supreme Court an original and seven copies of the petition, or, with tn*
Clerk of the Court of Appeals, an original and four copies, together with tn*
fee for filing a notice of appeal in the trial court and the docketing fee in tne
appellate court. If an order is issued authorizing the appeal, the clerk of tn*
appellate court shall immediately give notice of the order by mail to tn
respective parties and shall transmit a certified copy of the order, togetne
with a copy of the petition and filing fee, to the trial court where the P ^ V ^ J
and order shall be filed in lieu of a notice of appeal. If the petition is denied
the filing fee shall be refunded.
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(c) Content of petition. The petition shall contain:
(1) A statement of the facts necessary to an understanding of the controlling question of law determined by the order sought to be reviewed;
(2) A statement of the question of law and a demonstration that the
question was properly raised before the trial court and ruled upon;
(3) A statement of the reasons why an immediate interlocutory appeal
should be permitted; and
(4) A statement of the reason why the appeal may materially advance
the termination of the litigation.
(5) The petition shall include a copy of the order of the trial court from
which an appeal is sought and any related findings of fact, conclusions of
law and opinion.
(d) Answer. Within 10 days after service of the petition, any other party
may file an answer in opposition or concurrence. An original and seven copies
of the answer shall be filed in the Supreme Court. An original and four copies
shall be filed in the Court of Appeals. The petition and any answer shall be
submitted without oral argument unless otherwise ordered.
(e) Grant of permission. An appeal from an interlocutory order may be
granted only if it appears that the order involves substantial rights and may
materially affect the final decision or that a determination of the correctness
of the order before final judgment will better serve the administration and
interests of justice. The order permitting the appeal may set forth the particular issue or point of law which will be considered and may be on such terms,
including the filing of a bond for costs and damages, as the appellate court
may determine. If the petition is granted, the appeal shall be deemed to have
been docketed by the granting of the petition, and all proceedings subsequent
to the granting of the petition shall be as, and within the time required, for
appeals from final judgments.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
Challenge to sufficiency of evidence.
Determination regarding substantial rights.
Irreparable damage.
New trial motion.
—Arbitrary exercise of authority.
Order vacating summary judgment.
Purpose in granting.
When to grant.
Cited.
.
Challenge to sufficiency of evidence.
Intermediate appeal, and not writ of habeas
corpus, was only proper means to challenge
sufficiency of evidence to support issuance of
indictment and trial court s denial of dsfendant's request for discovery of testimony of witnesses before grand jury. Granato v. Salt Lake
County Grand Jury, 557 P.2d 750 (Utah 1976).
Determination
regarding
substantial
rights.
Where plaintiff sued for injuries suffered
when her son's car, in which she was riding,
collided with a cow which had fallen on high-

way from defendant's truck, preliminary order
by the trial court that unlawful loading of the
t r u c k w a s negligence as a matter of law and
that the trial should be held only on the issue
0 f damages involved substantial rights of the
parties and would materially affect the final
decision and, therefore, was subject to an intermediate appeal. Klafta v. Smith, 17 Utah 2d
$&, 404 P.2d 659 (1965).
Irreparable damage.
Temporary order allocating water usage by
plaintiff pending further study by court raised
sufficient issue of irreparable damage pending
t h e flling of t h e final o r d e r f l x i n g a n d d e c r e e .
i n g t h e w a t e r r i g h t s o f t h e respective parties as
^ appealable. In re Water Rights, 10 Utah
to
2d 77 348 P2d 679 (1960)
New trial motion.
—Arbitrary exercise of authority.
If a trial court's authority with respect to a
motion for a new trial is exercised arbitrarily,
the proper redress is either in a petition for
interlocutory appeal, which may be granted in
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